Monthly Archives: November 2012

Prosperous and Justice Party (PKS) : An Overview of Their Competitiveness and Strategies after 2004 Elections

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Prosperous and Justice Party (PKS) : An Overview of Their Competitiveness and Strategies after 2004 Elections

Diposkan oleh Ahmad Dzakirin On 08.35
*Bachtiar Firdaus

This paper provides an analysis on the PKS Competitiveness, their strategies and its interaction with the Government of Indonesia (GOI)  using Porter’s Diamond  and J Curve frameworks with effort to smooth and to sustain their policy reform process. In the first section, it will analyze the background of PKS movement and analyze their competitiveness and their strategies movement in Indonesia political world. The second part will examine the PKS interaction and their impacts to the GOI. The third section will give recommendation for the PKS activities in the future to overcome and to sustain the PKS movement and conclude their role in the Indonesian political development.   

PKS Movement 
  1. PKS Background
PKS is based on the campus and school dakwah (the propagation/preaching of Islamic faith) movement which arose in the late 1970s and expand their  movement to NGO social service during 1980s-1990s base on adoption of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) strategy movement. After they  founded KAMMI (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia or Indonesian Muslim Student Action Union), as a one of “avant-garde” of student movement which took active role in the reformation movement during 1998s, they established their “new face” as a new political party, the Justice Party on July 20, 1998, with Dr Nurmahmudi Ismail as its first president. The Justice Party was reconstituted as the Prosperous Justice Party in April 2003 after the Justice Party failed to meet the required two percent of electoral threshold in the 1999 election that it needed to contest the 2004 election.

During the 2004 legislative elections with Dr M Hidayat Nur Wahid as its second president (now is the Chairman of the MPR RI), using “clean and caring” campaign with their constant incorruptible legislators and their active involvement in providing community service, the PKS won 7.3% of the popular vote and 45 out of 550 seats, making it the seventh-largest party in Indonesia parliament. For the 2009 elections, with Ir Tifatul Sembiring as its third president, the PKS set their target to get at least 20 % of the popular vote legislative election which will act as a base to support its own president candidate in the presidential election.

PKS (also its former party: PK) declares from the beginning that their party is different from other party because PKS is “dakwah party” which means their primary goal is the promotion of Islam and uses it as a foundation of their policies . Besides that, they also states that PKS organization principle is “al hizb huwal jama’ah – al jama’ah huwal hizb” which means that the party is jama’ah (religious organization) and jama’ah is the party.

Different from other Islamist parties, PKS leaders have often spoken of their support for a society based on “the Madinah Charter”, an agreement between the Muslim community led by the Prophet Muhammad and the non Muslim citizens of the Madinah city. They believed that the Madinah Charter is preferable to the Jakarta Charter because it has been proven to work in a pluralistic society and provides guarantees for non Muslim citizens base on the same principles as a Muslims citizens like equality, rule of law, and justice.

  1. PKS Competitiveness and Strategies 
PKS’s competitiveness in Indonesia political condition were analyze base on Porter’s Diamond  framework which has been modified and focusing on PKS’s performance in which PKS develop their identity, resources, capabilities, and managerial styles. To sustain its competitive advantage, PKS requires good practice not only in their operational effectiveness, but also in their dynamic advantage that they must broaden and extend the basis of their competitive advantage by constantly innovate and upgrade their performance. The Porter’s Diamond consists of PKS factors condition; PKS strategy and rivalry; PKS demands condition; and PKS supporting and related institution as describes in Exhibit 1. PKS’s openness and stability were analyze base on modified J Curve framework which has been modified and focusing on the notion that PKS are stable either because they are open or because they are closed as describes in Exhibit 2.

Elizabeth Collins argues that PKS leadership has largely succeeded achieving good image as the party of moral reform while engaged in pragmatic politics and good choice as moderate Islamist party, but they have not yet found a way to extend their base to organized labor, peasants and unemployed poor. This paper will show that after 2004, her judgment about PKS success is not accurate anymore, PKS has change in terms of their decreasing image as the party of moral reform (as a result of their involvement in the ruling government); constant as a moderate Islamist party but has expanded their base to organized labor, peasants and unemployed poor.

PKS Factors Condition 

PKS have a strong Islamic ideology which inspired from MB movements (especially their ideology and recruitment strategies) and they had about 500 000 members in 2005 with special characterized: clean, young, educated, loyal, and committed members. They also had broad organizations structure in every province and district in Indonesia and every “kecamatan” in Java. Differ fro other parties, PKS had many regular activities including continuous recruitment, training, development social and humanitarian service which not depend on election term cycle.

PKS members are known of their homogeny style as a result of their “tarbiyah” (refers to the Islamic education process in which PKS member join a small circles groups (halaqah) where they taught about the Islamic values and its implementation in their daily life including discuss party programs) activities and mostly have urban background as a result of their higher education, less in the rural areas.

Their organization weaknesses are: first, they tend to be a modern party organization but they do not use performance base and activity base costing in their activities. Secondly, their ideology has been perceived as transnational ideology which not base on Indonesian culture or tradition. Thirdly, they only have a little funding, mainly from members and only a little portion from private-public sectors. Fourth, there is little involvement of a new prominent person from outside party organization. As a result, they only have modest expertise to plan and implement their movement to the “real world”.

PKS Strategy and Rivalry 

After Soeharto era, GOI regulation has been favoring democracy with permitting “multy party” model and “free press” in their democracy. There is competition between political parties with different ideology. PKS gain benefit from the weaknesses in others political parties which still deal with old problems: their corrupt culture; “traditional” party; and least activities (only have activities during election campaign). Compare to other parties, PKS relatively well organized in their “fighting programs” (program perjuangan) which change every five years following Indonesia election cycle.

PKS always has been suspect of their possibility to implement Sharia law to move Indonesia in the direction towards Islamic state. After 2004 election, PKS clear and caring platform has been diminish, not only because their involvement in the ruling government (where it took unpopular decision to raise fuel prices and its association with the GOI’s ineffectiveness and corruptibility), but also their zigzags towards governor, mayor or regent candidates election with no visible common political and no common standard track records background . PKS starting act as an opportunistic political party which supports anyone who might get into power.

PKS’s legislators and executives have weakness in making, implement, evaluate public policy concept. They tend to have difficulties in transform their Islamist and populist idea to be a bills, laws, and regulations. PKS also have weakness in making stable alliance with others institutions including Islamic base organization like Nahdatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, Hidayatullah, and Persatuan Islam which perceive that PKS will take their “traditional” grassroots and infiltrate their institutions.

At the same time, PKS has more intense competition from other Islamist base organization like Hizbut Tahrir and Salafiy movements which tend to do the same mass recruitment in the schools and campuses that has been base of PKS movement’s.  This condition has been worsen with terrorism issues and Islamist radicalism in which PKS still do not have clear position. Another issues is unity of others political parties especially nationalist parties to challenge PKS movement in the provincial and regional elections. The last but not the least is PKS less capability in dealing with mass media relation and public opinion which resulted in their decreasing image.  

PKS Demands Condition 

Again, after Soeharto era, Indonesian tends to have more demand to stop the “KKN” (acronym of Corruption, Collusion, and Nepotism) which benefit PKS as a new party who perceived consistent to fight the KKN. Besides that, Indonesian also tends to say enough to status quo element which again benefit PKS as a new party who consist of “new kids in the block” in the political arena. But these advantages can not easily combine to be a winning factor for PKS because they also have less capability to overcome the Indonesia social economic problem and have problem with their consistency in fighting the KKN. After 2004 election, massive publication about PKS legislators and PKS executives who succeed in fighting against corruption is not heard anymore, compare to its successive campaign about it before 2004 election.

PKS platform and program only understood by a moderate professional in middle class. Their platform also not been actively discuss in the public arena and challenge with other political parties platform. Except their intention to act base on Islamic values, their platform can only have little portion that really distinguished them from their competitors and rarely fought around the issues of fiscal policy and economic management that often dominate political debate in the West. Another challenge is “temptation” to tolerate other PKS members who became legislators and executives in the ruling government and to maintain stable alliance. At the same time, PKS social activities have been copied by other parties and institutions. As a result, to gain more voters and support from citizens, PKS need to act not only base on “charity” activities, but also “advocating” and “empowering” activities like continue to fight the KKN and be professional in their public roles.  

PKS Supporting and Related Institutions 

As a  dakwah party, PKS had many direct or indirect affiliate  dakwah institutions in campuses, schools, and many social services institutions in society which act as sources of recruitment and activities. Its ranging from KAMMI, LDK (Lembaga Dakwah Kampus or Campus Dakwah Institution) and LDS (Lembaga Dakwah Sekolah or School Dakwah Institution) which PKS only have indirect influence from its activist (they activist always change every years) to dakwah institutions like Khairu Ummah, Ma’had al Hikmah in Jakarta or Ma’had al Qud’wah in Depok which PKS have direct influence. PKS also controlled the student councils of many Indonesia’s largest and most prestigious state universities.

PKS also have many cadres and members who active in PKPU (Pos Keadilan Peduli Ummat or the National Humanitarian Foundation), BSMI (Bulan Sabit Merah Indonesia or Indonesian Red Crescent), JSIT (Jaringan Sekolah Islam Terpadu or  Integrated Islamic School), and ISTECS (Institute for Science and Technology Studies) which spread across Indonesia. They not only use these dakwah network to provide social service but also used and continued to be used as the key in recruiting members for PKS.

Despite have affiliation with many institutions above, PKS only have a little and small professional organization and think-thank institutions which is not the case in other Islamist movement like MB in Egypt who have a lot of it. Their dakwah institutions mostly consist of homogeny institutions not heterogenic institutions, therefore its influence is limited. They also weak in the business network empowerment which base on professionalism not base on politics/KKN.

PKS Openness

PKS membership is open to Indonesian but new member should oath to the God and to the Prophet to be a good activist in their activities. They also have non Muslim at their regional board in a largely non Muslim province like Irian Jaya, Sulawesi Utara and Nusa Tenggara Timur which demonstrates that PKS is tolerant of non Muslims and their right to express their views and be involved in politics.

As a cadre’s organization, PKS’s members should establish strong record of  tarbiyah involvement, to service their community and also showing detailed knowledge of PKS ideology and policies. In the PKS  tarbiyah process, the new members should start from anggota pemula  (beginning member), anggota muda (young member), anggota madya (intermediate member), anggota dewasa (mature member) and anggota ahli (expert member) which each duration length process ranging from 2-5 years for each stage.

As a result of their tarbiyah process, it’s difficult to engage prominent persons into PKS because they have to start from the beginning. To accommodate this situation, PKS leaders established Dewan Pakar (Advisory Council of Expert for the Party) in February 2004 who is to advise the young leaders of PKS on political, economic and social issues . But the  tarbiyah processes also have been concern of PKS leaders as a trade off between their position as cadre’s based party or as mass bases party strategies  which can change and resulted in different form of their organization process.  

PKS Stability 

As a  dakwah party which have “al hizb huwal jama’ah – al jama’ah huwal hizb” as organization principles (it means that for the cadre’s, the party is their  jama’ah/religious organization and jama’ah is their party), PKS is well known of their well organized by cadres. Their cadres will follow whatever their leaders decided to which known as “sami’na wa atho’na” principle (we listen and we obey), as long as it do not violate Islamic values which resulted in the militancy of their cadres.

Their highest institution is the Consultative Council (Majelis Syuro) which sets the party vision and elects the party’s Central Board, Majelis Pertimbangan Pusat and Dewan Syariah Pusat. Members of the Consultative Council are in turn elected by senior cadres called “core member” which reflects Lenin’s notion of “the democratic centralism” (whereby rank and file members are strictly subordinate to the leadership, decision making is to be central in formulation with rank and file members copying out orders received but higher bodies are to be democratically accountable to the membership at periodic meetings) to project the power of an ideological perspective into the political arena.  

III. PKS Interaction with the GOI and Its Impact 

Since founded, PKS and its former party PK, always uses massive dakwah movement in schools and campuses which resulted in new Islamic culture in Indonesia such as many young women wear long headscarves, many children study Al Qur’an and Islamic text and many men in PKS do not smoke. PKS is the first party after “orde baru” which use Islam as ideology. After 1999 election, despite its small votes (only 1.36 % of the vote), they actively involved in the “poros tengah” (central axis) which appeared to prevent Megawati becoming President and succeeded in making Abdurrahman Wahid as a President and Amien Rais as a Chairman of MPR. After that, in October 1999, Dr Nur Mahmudi Ismail was appointed as a Minister of forestry and resigned as a PK President and in their National Syuro on Mei 2000, PKS elected Dr M Hidayat Nur Wahid as a new PK President.

During his leadership, PKS made several unique characteristic such as: it’s known of their peaceful and well ordered capability in organizing several big mass demonstrations which get more sympathize from public; they also actively engaged in the social activity and “search and rescue” programs such as flood, natural disaster, or accident like fire; and their also actively involved in Sharia implementation at several region like Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, Cianjur, Bekasi and so on.

Based on that special characteristics combine with successful campaign of Clear and Caring jargon on issues of corruption and good governance proved by their legislative member and their executive minister (Dr Nur Mahmudi Ismail and Suripto in Minister of Forestry) during 1999-2004 era; their moderate views; also their ability to avoid major corruption scandals or internal party conflict; and their militant members active participation, during 2004 election they was the only party that contested in the 1999 elections who make major gains in the 2004 parliamentary elections, lifting its vote to 7.3 % to have 1100 member of legislative in central and local government.

After that, they involved in the “Koalisi Kerakyatan” which support President SBY and succeeded making Dr Hidayat Nur Wahid as a Chairman of MPR. In the Cabinet, PKS also get several ministerial position: Dr Anton Apriyantono as a Minister of Agriculture, M Yusuf Asyari MSi as a Minister of People’s Housing, and Dr Adhyaksa Dault as a Minister of Youth and Sport.

IV. Recommendation and Conclusion 

Recommendation for the PKS activities in the Future Based on analysis above, PKS problem tree analyses are describe in Exhibit 3. To overcome their challenge and problem above, there are several proposals for PKS management process reform to smooth and to sustain its implementation base on the 7-S Framework, which are:

1.    Strategy, the PKS leaders has to act quickly and decisive to get public acceptance and public confidence before 2009 election. Besides that, the PKS leaders should establish new internal commission which have strong investigatory powers and also work to prevent internal incompetence and ineffective activities, not just to find but punish those caught at being corrupt. They also have to work closely with PKS members to sustain their effort to take a leading role in Indonesia political in order to implement justice and give prosperous to Indonesian peoples.
2.    Structure, PKS should use of divisional organization form or matrix organization form which designed to react quickly and effectively to threats and opportunities related to its focus (e.g. to overcome PKS incompetent and ineffective management process problems). To achieve its strategy, PKS will focuses on three corresponding functions, which are the operation function which analyze, propose, implement and evaluate daily activities; the internal commission which carry out the vulnerability assessment and deal with it; and the community relation function which gather support and information from the public.
3.    Systems, to insure it’s clear and caring in the internal organization practices, PKS should conduct heavy rewards and punishment systems. PKS should establish renewable contracts of one year and make sure that renewal is base on effective performance of their executive and legislative members. Besides that, PKS should have internal commission unit that have power to scrutiny their officers to raise the risk of being caught and to reduce incentive to do incompetent and ineffective activities.
4.   Staffing, to get public’s support and confidence, PKS should recruit their executives, legislatives, and Central Board members base on solely of their capability (skills) and credibility (honesty and integrity). The new recruits of their executives and legislatives members should be inquiry to intense their background checks.
5.   Skills, PKS officers should be train by the expert from other “best” organizations including business organizations to study and to apply most advanced skills, techniques and equipments in dealing with management of modern organization.
6.   Style, to get involved in something as sensitive as the organization reforms, PKS leaders and officers should act as a truly professional (expert, skilled, and even certified) and work together with other PKS affiliate institutions and with PKS member in doing their job to impress and to get support from all of Indonesian citizenry.
7.   Shared Values, to fulfill its mission to reform PKS incompetent and ineffective management process, PKS should conceptualize their mission in three parts, which are they will raise the risk of being caught on corruption, they will recommend the reorganize of PKS bureaucracies to reduce opportunities of incompetent and ineffective, and they will raise the moral costs of being incompetent and ineffective. PKS also have to spread their anti incompetent and ineffective messages and values to the public with new jargon: “Clear, Caring, and Professional” through of mass media involvement including TV advertisement, radio programs, and special pamphlets.
To support the assessment above, there are several recommendations of PKS incompetent and ineffective management process reform to smooth its implementation base on 3C2M Framework, which are:
1.  Communications, do not forget to prepare information materials about the incompetent and ineffective management reform process in various ways: starts from policy briefs documents, policy options agenda, and press releases in multimedia to assure that their management process reforms can be recognize and get full support from  various stakeholders. To support communications in their management process reform,  PKS leaders should approach their officers, cadres, and members with transparency in providing sufficient background, its technical underpinning and the explanation of proposed management reforms.
2.  Champions, to introduce and get attention in their management process reform justification, PKS need credible spokespersons from various backgrounds including their top leaders, religious key person, prominent management process experts, outstanding “murobbi” (tarbiyah teachers), and even their nasyid (religious singer) stars. These champions can break the initial barriers to communicate their management process reform and to provide more complex and technical information.
3.   Coalitions, in every reform and change, there are supporters of status quo who feel their will lose in the management process reform. If PKS reformists do not prepare to make counter coalition to balance the status quo, PKS reformist will lose the management process reform. After PKS reformists made the management process reform coalition, it will help PKS reformists position in the dialogue and discussion about it. PKS reformists can offer the opponent of the management process reform to be part of the management process reform review committee. This can reduced the tension between proponent and opponent off the management process reform.
4.   Mobilizations, to support and maintain the coalition and management process reform, PKS need an imaginative and participative employment of advocacy groups including various task forces, advisory groups, and steering committees which can build consensus in each province and region. To boost the credibility and capability of the management process reform, PKS need to conduct various meetings such as conferences, seminars, public hearings, summits, consultations, and workshop. These events also can create good publication and public opinion to back up PKS position. 5.  Managements of Perceptions, to make management process reform succeed, PKS need assurance from their top leaders to always support management process reform. These can make mass media role easier in shaping public opinion to support the management process reform because there is unity of view of PKS top leaders.
Conclusion: PKS Role in the Indonesian Political Development 

To be effective in dealing with PKS incompetent and ineffective management process reform, PKS must have a high degree of fit or well aligned among these 7-C elements (internal alignment) that is each S is consistent with and reinforces the other S’s. Besides that, PKS also should stay aligned with their external environment including the GOI, other GOI institutions and Indonesian citizenry to get their sustain support to overcome PKS incompetent and ineffective management process problems.

 *Alumnus LKYSPP, NUS, Singapore

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Posted by on November 30, 2012 in Uncategorized


Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party

Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
This article needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (July 2013)
Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party
ڤرتي اسلام س-مليسيا
Parti Islam Se-Malaysia
மலேசிய இஸ்லாமிய கட்சி
PAS logo.svg
Leader Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat (Spiritual Advisor)
Abdul Hadi Awang (President)
Deputy President Mohamad Sabu
Founded 1951
Headquarters Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
Newspaper Harakah
Youth wing Dewan Pemuda PAS
Ideology Islamism,
Islamic democracy,
Religious conservatism
National affiliation Barisan Nasional (1974–78)
Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah(1989–1996)
Barisan Alternatif (1999–2004)
Pakatan Rakyat (2008–present)
Colors White, Green
21 / 222
Politics of Malaysia
Political parties
Politics of Malaysia.png
This article is part of a series on the
politics and government of

The Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (Jawi: ڤرتي اسلام س-مليسيا, MalayParti Islam Se-MalaysiaChinese: 马来西亚伊斯兰党, Tamil: மலேசிய இஸ்லாமிய கட்சி) commonly known as PAS or Pas, is an Islamist political party in Malaysia and is currently headed by Dato’ Seri Abdul Hadi Awang. PAS positions itself as a political party that aims to establish Malaysia as a country based on Islamic legal theory derived from the primary sources of Islam, the QuranSunnah as well as Hadiths, as opposed to Barisan Nasional‘s Islam Hadhari, which PAS sees as based on a watered-down understanding of Islam.[1]

The party enjoys strong support from the northern rural and conservative states such as Kelantan and Terengganu and it also enjoys strong support from developed state such as Selangor. It is also the first opposition party in independent Malaysia’s history to defeat the Barisan Nasional coalition in a Malay dominated state. PAS, together with Parti Keadilan Rakyat (known as PKR), and Democratic Action Party (known as DAP) formed part of a coalition called Pakatan Rakyat following the 2008 election. Together, Pakatan Rakyat now controls three states in Malaysia which are Kelantan,Selangor and Penang. Now, many young people from other states support this party such as KedahPahangPerak and Johor.




The formation of Hizbul Muslimin[edit]

In March 1947, the first Pan-Islamic Malaysian conference at Madrasah Ma’ahad al-Ehya as-Sharif at Gunung Semanggul, Perak, was held. The conference was sponsored by Parti Kebangsaan Melayu Malaya (PKMM) under the leadership of Dr. Burhanuddin al-Helmy. The conference set out to address the economic problems faced by the Malay-Muslims. It was meant to bring together the more politically active and progressive Islamic movements and thinkers in the country. As a result of this conference, the Majlis Agama Tertinggi (Supreme Religious Council, MATA) of Malaya was formed.

MATA began organising political events and meetings for Malay-Muslim activists to meet and discuss their plans for the future and the need to mobilise the masses. The Council also organised a conference on March 13–16, 1948 which discussed local and international issues which are of concern to the public. The conference participants felt that UMNO was not doing enough to raise important issues in public and that the conservative-nationalists were not doing enough to stand up for Malay-Muslim rights. Needless to say, the UMNO representatives at MATA were not happy with the tone of discussion set by the Islamists, which was too revolutionary and militant for their taste. The UMNO delegates reported their findings and observations to the party leaders. In due course, UMNO leader Dato Onn Jaafar began to issue warnings about the “threat from the mountain” (a reference to Gunung Semanggul).

The Parti Orang Muslimin Malaya (Hizbul Muslimin) was formed on March 17, 1948. Syeikh Abdullah Fahim, the paternal grandfather of former Prime MinisterAbdullah Ahmad Badawi, played a major role in its formation. After the second conference it declared that MATA should be reorganised as an Islamic political party. With the formation of Hizbul Muslimin, all political activities were transferred to the organisation. MATA served as the party’s religious affairs bureau. However, the first Islamist party in Malaya was not destined to last long, as they were banned by the British authorities anxious to retain control of the territories, alleging that Hizbul Muslimin have ties with the Communist Party of Malaya.

Demise and revival[edit]

Many members of Hizbul Muslimin escaped the purge of the British and joined UMNO. When the ulama faction in UMNO broke away from the party, they formed an association called Persatuan Islam Sa-Malaya (PIS) (Pan-Islamic Malayan Association),[2] abbreviated as PAS. At the time, the association charter allowed for dual membership in PAS and UMNO and thus many PAS members thought of themselves as UMNO members and vice-versa. Eventually, the dual-membership clause in the party charter was revoked and PAS began to emerge as a distinct entity.[3] For the sake of contesting in the general election of 1955, the party was re-registered under the name Pan-Islamic Malayan Party (PIMP). The name was later changed to Parti Islam Se-Malaysiaduring the Asri Muda era in the 1970s.[4]

Recent development[edit]

In 1999, riding a groundswell of popular protest after the arrest and conviction of former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, PAS allied itself with the Democratic Action Party (DAP) andKeadilan (PKR), founded by Anwar Ibrahim‘s wife Wan Azizah by forming a coalition known as Barisan Alternatif. In the general election, PAS took over Terengganu from the Barisan Nasional.

In the 2004 Malaysian general election, the party’s strength was greatly reduced.[1] It won merely seven parliamentary seats, a significant decrease from the 27 parliamentary seats it had won in the 1999 general election. The party leader, Datuk Seri Abdul Hadi Awang even lost his parliamentary seat. PAS also lost control of Terengganu but retained control of Kelantan with a very slim majority of 24 out of 45 seats. [2]. The party’s majority in Kelantan’s state assembly was further reduced to 23 seats following the Pengkalan Pasir by-election in 2005 which left them with the majority of only one seat in the state assembly.

Alternative flag of PAS, occasionally flown along the official full-moon-on-a-green-field flag

In the recent 2008 Malaysian general election, PAS once again allied with the DAP and Anwar Ibrahim’s PKR in an alliance known as Pakatan Rakyat. The party made a comeback in Kelantan, winning 38 out of 45 seats as well as managing to take control of the west coast state of Kedah, and formed coalition governments in PenangPerak and Selangor, even providing Perak with its Chief Minister, though he was toppled following a series of defections in the state assembly the following year. The party also increased its share of MPs in the Malaysian Parliament from seven to 23.

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Posted by on November 30, 2012 in Uncategorized


Masyumi Party

Masyumi Party

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Masyumi Party
Partai Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia
Founded 1945
Dissolved 1960
Headquarters Jakarta
Ideology IslamPan-Islamism
Politics of Indonesia
Political parties

Masyumi Party (IndonesianPartai Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia) (Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations) was a major Islamic political party in Indonesia during the Liberal Democracy Era in Indonesia. It was banned in 1960 by President Sukarno for supporting the PRRI rebellion.



Masyumi was the name given to an organization established by the occupying Japanese in 1943 in an attempt to control Islam in Indonesia.[1]Following the Indonesian Declaration of Independence, on 7 November 1945 a new organization called Masyumi was formed. In less than a year it became the largest political party in Indonesia. It included the Islamic organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. During the period of liberal democracy era, Masyumi members had seats in the People’s Representative Council and the party supplied prime ministers such asMuhammad Natsir and Burhanuddin Harahap.[2]

President Sukarno at a 1954 Masyumi convention

Masyumi came second in the 1955 election. It won 7,903,886 votes, representing 20.9% of the popular vote,[3] resulting in 57 seats in parliament. Masyumi was popular in modernist Islamic regions such as West SumatraJakarta, and Aceh. 51.3% of Masyumi’s vote came from Java, but Masyumi was the dominant party for regions outside Java, and it established itself as the leading party for the one third of people living outside Java.[4][5] InSumatraKalimantan, and Sulawesi, Masyumi gained a significant share of the vote. In Sumatra, 42.8% voted for Masyumi.[6] while the figure for Kalimantan was 32%,[7] and for Sulawesi 33.9%.[8]

In 1958, some Masyumi members joined the PRRI rebellion against Sukarno. As a result, in 1960 Masyumi (and the Socialist Party) were banned.[9]

Following the banning, Masyumi members and followers established the Crescent Star Family (IndonesianKeluarga Bulan Bintang) to campaign for Islamic shariah law and teachings. An attempt was made to reestablish the party following the transition to the New Order, but this was not permitted. After the fall of Suharto in 1998, another attempt was made to revive the party name, but eventually Masyumi followers and others established theCrescent Star Party, which contested the legislative elections in 19992004 and 2009.[10]


  1. Jump up^ Ricklefs (1991) p194
  2. Jump up^ Simanjuntak (2003)
  3. Jump up^ Feith (2007)
  4. Jump up^ Feith (2007) p436-437
  5. Jump up^ Ricklefs (1991) p238
  6. Jump up^ Sumatera, Runtuhnya Benteng Penguasaan Partai. February 13, 2009.
  7. Jump up^ Kalimantan, Heterogenitas yang Statis February 19, 2009.
  8. Jump up^ Sulawesi, Merangkai Konfigurasi Baru Penguasaan Politik. February 27, 2009.
  9. Jump up^ Ricklefs (1991) p256
  10. Jump up^ ‘ Bambang Setiawan & Bestian Nainggolan (Eds) (2004) pp54-55


  • Bambang Setiawan & Bestian Nainggolan (Eds) (2004) ‘Partai-Partai Politik Indonesia: Ideologi dan Program 2004-2009 (Indonesian Political Parties: Ideologies and Programs 2004-2009Kompas (1999) ISBN 978-979-709-121-7 Indonesian
  • Feith, Herbert (2007) The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia Equinox Publishing (Asia) Pte Ltd, ISBN 978-979-3780-45-0
  • Ricklefs, M.C. (1991). A history of modern Indonesia since c.1200. Stanford: Stanford University Press. ISBN 978-0-8047-4480-5
  • Simanjuntak, P.H.H (2003) Kabinet-Kabinet Republik Indonesia: Dari Awal Kemerdekaan Sampai Reformasi (Cabinets of the Republic of Indonesia: From the Start of Independence to the Reform era, Penerbit Djambatan, Jakarta, ISBN 978-979-428-499-5
  • Feith, Herbert (1999) Pemilihan Umum 1955 di Indonesia (Translated from The Indonesian Elections of 1955) Kepustakaan Popular Gramedia ISBN 978-979-9023-26-1

See also[edit]

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Posted by on November 30, 2012 in Uncategorized


Prosperous Justice Party

Prosperous Justice Party

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Prosperous Justice Party
Partai Keadilan Sejahtera
Partai Keadilan Sejahtera Logo.svg
Chairman Anis Matta
Secretary-General Taufiq Ridho
Founded 20 April 2002
(20 July 1998 as Justice Party)
Headquarters Jakarta
Ideology Islamism,
Islamic democracy,
Social conservatism
DPR Seats
57 / 560
Politics of Indonesia
Political parties

The Prosperous Justice Party (IndonesianPartai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS)), sometimes called the Justice and Prosperity Party, is a political partyin Indonesia. The party is Islamist in the sense that it calls for a central role for Islam in public life.[1] PKS is currently led by Anis Matta.




The party was established as the Justice Party on July 20, 1998, with Nurmahmudi Ismail as its first president. The Justice Party was reconstituted as the Prosperous Justice Party in April 2002 after the Justice Party failed to meet the required two percent of electoral threshold in the 1999 election that it needed to contest the 2004 election.[2] During the 2004 legislative elections, the PKS won 7.3% of the popular vote and 45 out of 550 seats, making it the seventh-largest party in parliament. This was a gain from the 1.4% received in 1999. In addition, its leader Hidayat Nur Wahid was elected speaker of the People’s Consultative Assembly. PKS’s strongest support is in major urban centers, particularly Jakarta, where it won the largest share of seats in 2004. In the 2009 elections, the party’s came fourth, its share of the vote rose to 7.88% and it gained 12 extra legislative seats.[3][4] [5][6] It now has 57 seats in the People’s Representative Council.

The PKS is known for its public opposition to political corruption; this stance was widely reported as a major factor in the party’s increased success in 2004.[7] However, this image has been under attack in recent times, as several alleged cases of grafts are suspected to be connected to several prominent party politicians.[8][9][10] The party is closely associated with Islamic teachings, but according to its leadership does not promote the mandatory implementation of sharia, requiring Indonesia’s Muslims to follow Islamic law.[11] Many of its campaigns are based on conservative religious teachings, such as opposition to the selling of pornography,[12] and for strict punishments for violations of narcotics laws.[13]

The party has been associated with the Egypt-based Muslim Brotherhood; several of its founders attended Brotherhood-related schools.[14] The organization stages rallies supporting Hamas in its conflict with Israel, and against the influence of the United States both in the Middle East and in Indonesia.[15]

After the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, PKS sent volunteer relief workers to Aceh,[16] and has been involved in several other relief and reconstruction projects.

Over the years, the party has experienced prolonged internal rivalry, particularly between camps that can be identified as pragmatist on the one hand, and idealist on the other. The pragmatist camp has generally been made up of younger, secular-educated functionaries while older functionaries who often are graduates from institutes in the Middle East make up the idealist camp.[17]

The October 5 2011 edition of Indonesian TV news program “Liputan 6 Petang” reported PKS Deputy Secretary-General and member of Indonesia’s House of Representatives Fahri Hamzah had recently floated the idea of disbanding Indonesia’s Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi or KPK). [18] [19] According to Kompas daily, Deputy Chairman of House of Representatives Commission III responsible for legal affairs, human rights and security Fahri Hamzah first made the suggestion to disband the Corruption Eradication Commission in a consultation meeting at the House on Monday October 3 2011. [20]

Regional perspective

In the legislative election held on 9 April 2009, support for the PKS was higher than the party’s national average in the following provinces:[citation needed]

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Posted by on November 30, 2012 in Uncategorized


Welfare Party

Welfare Party

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
“Welfare Party” redirects here. For indian political party, see Welfare Party of India.
Welfare Party
Refah Partisi
Leader Ahmet Tekdal
Founder Ahmet Tekdal
Slogan Justice is our goal
Founded 1983
Dissolved 1998
Preceded by National Salvation Party
Succeeded by Virtue Party
Headquarters  TurkeyAnkara
Ideology Sunni Islamism
Religion Sunni Islam
Politics of Turkey
Political parties

A clock displaying the emblem of the Welfare Party. The party slogan translates as “Justice is our goal.”

The Welfare Party(Refah Partisi, RP) was an Islamist political party in Turkey. It was founded by Ali Türkmen, Ahmet Tekdal and Necmettin Erbakanin Ankara in 1983 as heir to two earlier parties, (National Order Party, MNP) and (National Salvation Party, MSP), which were banned from politics. The RP participated in mayoral elections at that time and they won in three cities KonyaŞanlıurfa, and Van. Their vote percentage was approximately 5%.

Welfare Party participated in the 1991 elections in a triple alliance with (Nationalist Movement Party, MÇP) and Reformist Democracy Party(IDP). They gained 16.9% of the vote. They won 62 deputies but 19 ones of MÇP (with founding Democratic Movement Party in 25 December 1991 and joining the MÇP in 29 December 1991) and 3 ones of IDP left RP after it. Their popular vote increased over the years until they became the largest party under Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan in 1996. The coalition government of Erbakan was forced out of power by the Turkish military in 1997, due to being suspected of having an Islamist agenda.[1]

In 1998 the Welfare Party was banned for violating the principle of secularism in the constitution.[2] The ban was upheld by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) on 13 February 2003. The ECHR’s decision was criticized by Human Rights Watch for lack of consistency, as the ECHR had refused disbanding of other parties in several occasions.[3][4]

The incumbent Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was a former member of the party, now lead the ruling Justice and Development Party. The current President of TurkeyAbdullah Gül, was the deputy leader of the party up until it was dissolved.


  1. Jump up^ Karadjis, Michael (19 October 1997). “Behind the Turkish Military’s “Soft Coup””Green Left Weekly 294. Retrieved 28 August 2008.
  2. Jump up^ “Turkey’s Welfare Party is banned”BBC News. 16 January 1998.
  3. Jump up^ Turkey: Party Case Shows Need for Reform – Ruling Party Narrowly Escapes Court BanHuman Rights Watch, 31 July 2008
  4. Jump up^ Moe, Christian (September 2003). “Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey”International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law(International Center for Not-for-Profit Law) 6 (1). ISSN 1556-5157. Retrieved 28 August 2008.

External links

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Justice and Development Party (Turkey)

Justice and Development Party (Turkey)

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Justice and Development Party
Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi
Justice and Development Party Logo
Leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
Founded August 14, 2001
Headquarters No. 202 Balgat, AnkaraTurkey
Youth wing AK Gençlik
Ideology Economic liberalism[1]
Social conservatism[1][2][3]
Political position Centre-right[4]
European affiliation Alliance of European Conservatives and Reformists
Colours Yellow, orange, blue, white
327 / 550
Local communities:
688 / 2,919
Politics of Turkey
Political parties

The Justice and Development Party (TurkishAdalet ve Kalkınma Partisi), abbreviated JDP in English and AK PARTİ or AKP in Turkish, is acentre-rightsocial conservative political party in Turkey. It has developed from the tradition of Islamism, but has officially abandoned this ideology in favour of “conservative democracy”.[5][6] The party is the largest in Turkey, with 327 members of parliament. Its leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, isPrime Minister, while fellow former party member and PM Abdullah Gül is President. In Turkish, Ak also means white.

Founded in 2001 by members of a number of existing parties, the party won a landslide victory in the 2002 election, winning over two-thirds of parliamentary seats. Abdullah Gül became Prime Minister, but a constitutional amendment in 2003 allowed Erdoğan to take his place. In early general elections in 2007, the AKP increased its share of the vote to 47%; its number of seats fell to 341, but Erdoğan was returned as PM, while Gül waselected President. In the general elections held on June 12, 2011, the AKP further increased its share of the popular vote to 49.8% and secured 327 parliamentary seats to form a third consecutive majority government.

The AKP portrays itself as a pro-Western and pro-American[7] party in the Turkish political spectrum that advocates a liberal market economy including Turkish membership in the European Union.[8] In 2005, the party was granted observer membership in the European People’s Party. In November 2013, the party left the EPP to join the Alliance of European Conservatives and Reformists instead.




The AK Party was established by a wide range of politicians of various political parties and a number of new politicians. The core of the party was formed from the reformist faction of the Virtue Party, including people such as Abdullah Gül and Bülent Arınç. A second founding group consisted of members of the social conservative Motherland Party who had been close to Turgut Özal, such as Cemil Çiçek and Abdülkadir Aksu. Some members of the Turkish Democratic Party, such as Hüseyin Çelik and Köksal Toptan, joined the AKP. Some members, such as Kürşad Tüzmen had nationalist or Ertuğrul Günay, had center-left backgrounds while representatives of the nascent ‘Muslim left’ current were largely excluded.[9] In addition a large number of people joined a political party for the first time, such as Ali BabacanSelma Aliye KavafEgemen Bağış and Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu. All of these people joined Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to found the new party.


Although the party is described as an Islamist party in some media, party officials reject those claims. According to former minister Hüseyin Çelik, “In the Western press, when the AK Party administration -the ruling party of the Turkish Republic- is being named, unfortunately most of the time ‘Islamic,’ ‘Islamist,’ ‘mildly Islamist,’ ‘Islamic-oriented,’ ‘Islamic-based’ or ‘with an Islamic agenda,’ and similar language is being used. These characterizations do not reflect the truth, and they sadden us,” Çelik said. “The AK Party is a conservative democratic party. The AK Party’s conservatism is limited to moral and social issues.”[10]


Closure cases[edit]

The Justice and Development Party has faced two closure cases in its history. Just 10 days before the national elections of 2002, Turkey’s chief prosecutor, Sabih Kanadoğlu, asked the Turkish constitutional court to close the Justice and Development Party, which was leading in the opinion polls at that time. The chief prosecutor accused the Justice and Development Party of abusing the law and justice. He based his case on the fact that the party’s leader had been banned from political life for reading a poem. The European Commission had already criticised Turkey for banning the party’s leader from participating in elections.[11]

The 2008 AKP closure trial was a further attempt in 2008 to close the AKP and ban 71 leading members from politics for five years. At an international press conference in Spain, the prime minister answered a question of a journalist by saying, “What if the headscarf is a symbol? Even if it were a political symbol, does that give [one the] right to ban it? Could you bring prohibitions to symbols?” These statements led to a joint proposal of the AK Party and the MHP for changing the constitution and the law to lift a ban on young women wearing headscarves at universities. This was one of the main reasons for Turkey’s chief prosecutor, Abdurrahman Yalçınkaya, to ask the Constitutional Court to close the AK Party.[12][13][14] The closure request failed as only 6 of the 11 judges ruled in favour, with 7 required; however 10 judges agreed that the AKP had become “a center for anti-secular activities”, leading to a loss of state funding for the party.[15]


2002 general elections[edit]

The AK party won a sweeping victory in the 2002 elections, which saw every party previously represented in the Grand National Assembly ejected from the chamber. In the process, it won a two-thirds majority of seats, becoming the first Turkish party in 11 years to win an outright majority. Erdoğan normally would have become prime minister, but was banned from holding any political office after a 1994 incident in which he read a poem deemed pro-Islamist by judges. As a result, Gül became prime minister. It survived the crisis over the 2003 invasion of Iraq despite a massive back bench rebellion where over a hundred AK Party MPs joined those of the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) in parliament to prevent the government from allowing the United Statesto launch a Northern offensive in Iraq from Turkish territory. Later, Erdoğan’s ban was abolished with the help of the CHP and Erdoğan became prime minister by being selected to parliament after a by-election in Siirt.

Party leader Erdoğan on a poster thanking the people for the election results.

The AK Party has undertaken structural reforms, and during its rule Turkey has seen rapid growth and an end to its three decade long period of high inflation rates. Inflation had fallen to 8.8% by 2004.

Influential business publications such as The Economist consider the AK Party’s government the most successful in Turkey in decades.[16]

2004 local elections[edit]

In the local elections of 2004, the AK Party won 42% of the votes, making inroads against the secular nationalist Republican People’s Party (CHP) on the South and West Coasts, and against the Social Democratic People’s Party, which is supported by some Kurds in the South-East of Turkey.

In January 2005, the AK Party was admitted as an observer member in the European People’s Party (EPP). However, it left the EPP to join theAlliance of European Conservatives and Reformists (AECR) in 2013.

2007 elections[edit]

Voter base by monthly household income. AK Party is the largest party in group 1, 2, 3 and 4, while CHP is the largest in group 5, the richest 20% of Turkey.

On April 14, 2007, an estimated 300,000 people marched in Ankara to protest the possible candidacy of Erdoğan in the 2007 presidential election, afraid that if elected as President, he would alter the secular nature of the Turkish state.[17] Erdoğan announced on April 24, 2007 that the party had decided to nominate Abdullah Gül as the AK Party candidate in the presidential election.[18] The protests continued over the next several weeks, with over one million reported at an April 29 rally in Istanbul,[19][20] tens of thousands reported at separate protests on May 4 in Manisa and Çanakkale,[21] and one million in İzmir on May 13.[22]

Early parliamentary elections were called after the failure of the parties in parliament to agree on the next Turkish president. The opposition parties boycotted the parliamentary vote and deadlocked the election process. At the same time, Erdoğan claimed the failure to elect a president was a failure of the Turkish political system and proposed to modify the constitution.

The AK Party achieved victory in the rescheduled July 22, 2007 elections with 46.6% of the vote, translating into control of 341 of the 550 available parliamentary seats. Although the AK Party received significantly more votes in 2007 than in 2002, the number of parliamentary seats they controlled decreased due to the rules of the Turkish electoral system. However, they retained a comfortable ruling majority.[8] “Don’t Stop, Keep Going On!” was the slogan of the Justice and Development Party in the general elections of 2007.

Territorially, the elections of 2007 saw a major advance for the AK Party, with the party outpolling the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party in traditional Kurdish strongholds such as Van andMardin, as well as outpolling the secular-left CHP in traditionally secular areas such as Antalya and Artvin. Overall, the AK Party secured a plurality of votes in 68 of Turkey’s 81 provinces, with its strongest vote of 71% coming from Bingöl. Its weakest vote, a mere 12%, came from Tunceli, the only Turkish province where the Alevi form a majority.[23] Abdullah Gül was elected President in late August with 339 votes in the third round – the first at which a simple majority is required – after deadlock in the first two rounds, in which a two-thirds majority is needed.

2007 constitutional referendum[edit]

A rally of the Justice and Development Party in 2007

After the opposition parties deadlocked the 2007 presidential election by boycotting the parliament, the ruling AK party proposed a constitutional reform package. The reform package was first vetoed by President Sezer. Then he applied to the Turkish constitutional courtabout the reform package, because the president is unable to veto amendments for the second time. The court did not find any problems in the package and 69% of the voters supported the constitutional changes. The reforms consisted of:

  • electing the president by popular vote instead of by parliament;
  • reducing the presidential term from seven years to five;
  • allowing the president to stand for re-election for a second term;
  • holding general elections every four years instead of five;
  • reducing the quorum of lawmakers needed for parliamentary decisions from 367 to 184.

2009 local elections[edit]

The Turkish local elections of 2009 took place during the financial crisis of 2007–2010. After the success of the AK Party in the 2007 general elections, the party saw a decline in the local elections of 2009. In these elections the AK Party received 39% of the vote, 3% less than in the local elections of 2004. Still, the AK Party remained the dominating party in Turkey. The second party CHP received 23% of the vote and the third party MHP received 16% of the vote. The AK Party won in Turkey’s largest cities: Ankara and Istanbul.[24]

2010 constitutional referendum[edit]

Reforming the Constitution was one of the main pledges of the AK Party during the 2007 election campaign. The main opposition party CHP was not interested in altering the Constitution on a big scale, making it impossible to form a Constitutional Commission (Anayasa Uzlaşma Komisyonu).[25] The amendments lacked the two-thirds majority needed to instantly become law, but secured 336 votes in the 550 seat parliament – enough to put the proposals to a referendum. The reform package included a number of issues: such as the right of individuals to appeal to the highest court, the creation of the ombudsman’s office, the possibility to negotiate a nation-wide labour contract, positive exceptions for female citizens, the ability of civilian courts to convict members of the military, the right of civil servants to go on strike, a privacy law, and the structure of the Constitutional Court. The referendum was agreed by a majority of 58%.

Merger with HAS Parti[edit]

In September 2012, two-year-old conservative-oriented People’s Voice Party (HAS Parti) dissolved itself and joined the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) with a majority of its delegates’ votes.[26] In July 2012, following long-held speculation that former HSP leader Numan Kurtulmuş was on Prime Minister Erdoğan’s mind as his possible successor as party head, Erdoğan personally proposed to Kurtulmuş the idea of merging the parties under the umbrella of the AKP.

Election results[edit]

General elections

Election date Party leader Number of votes received Percentage of votes Number of deputies
November 3, 2002 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 10,763,904 34.26% 363
July 22, 2007 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 16,327,291 46.58% 341
June 12, 2011 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 21,442,206 49.83% 326

Local elections

Election date Party leader Provincial council votes Percentage of votes Number of municipalities
March 28, 2004 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 13,447,287 42.18% 1750
March 29, 2009 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 15,513,554 38.83% 1404


Election date Party leader Yes vote Percentage No vote Percentage AK Party’s support
October 21, 2007 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 19,422,714 68.95 8,744,947 31.05 Yes vote
September 12, 2010 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 21,787,244 57.88 15,856,79 42.12 Yes vote


  • ^† JDP is the official one according to the party itself, as documented in the third article of the party charter, while AKP is mostly preferred by its opponents; the supporters prefer “AK Party” since the word “ak” in Turkish means “white”, “clean”, or “unblemished,” lending a positive impression.[27][28] The Chief Public Prosecutor of the Supreme Court of Appeals initially used “AKP”, but after an objection from the party,[29] “AKP” was replaced with “Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi” (without abbreviation) in documents.


  • Cizre, Ümit (ed.) (2008). Secular and Islamic politics in Turkey: The making of the Justice and Development Party. Routledge
  • Cizre, Ümit (2012). “A New Politics of Engagement: The Turkish Military, Society and the AKP”. Democracy, Islam, and secularism in Turkey (Columbia University Press)
  • Hale, William; Özbudun, Ergun (2010). Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: The Case of the AKP. Routledge
  • Yavuz, M. Hakan (ed.) (2006). The Emergence of a New Turkey: Islam, Democracy and the AK Parti. The University of Utah Press
  • Yavuz, M. Hakan (2009). Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey. Cambridge University Press


  1. Jump up to:a b Cook, Steven A. (2012). “Recent History: The Rise of the Justice and Development Party”.U.S.-Turkey Relations: A New Partnership (Council on Foreign Relations): 52
  2. Jump up^ Göçek, Fatma Müge (2011). The Transformation of Turkey: Redefining State and Society from the Ottoman Empire to the Modern Era. I.B. Tauris. p. 56
  3. Jump up^ Tocci, Nathalie (2012). “Turkey and the European Union”. The Routledge Handbook of Modern Turkey (Routledge): 241
  4. Jump up^ Head, Jonathan (12 September 2010). “Turkey referendum vote ends with close result expected”BBC. Retrieved 26 June 2013.
  5. Jump up^ Duran, Burhanettin (2008). “The Justice and Development Party’s ‘new politics’: Steering toward conservative democracy, a revised Islamic agenda or management of new crises”.Secular and Islamic politics in Turkey: 80 ff
  6. Jump up^ Akdoğan, Yalçın (2006). “The Meaning of Conservative Democratic Political Identity”. The Emergence of a New Turkey: 49 ff
  7. Jump up^
  8. Jump up to:a b “New to Turkish politics? Here’s a rough primer”Turkish Daily News. 2007-07-22. Retrieved 2008-07-22.
  9. Jump up^
  10. Jump up^
  11. Jump up^ “Turkey mulls banning leading party before elections”. EurActiv. October 23, 2002. Retrieved February 15, 2011.
  12. Jump up^ Gungor, Izgi (2008-07-22). “From landmark success to closure: AKP’s journey”Turkish Daily News. Retrieved 2008-08-11.
  13. Jump up^ “Closure case against ruling party creates shockwaves”Today’s Zaman. 2008-03-15. Retrieved 2008-11-16.
  14. Jump up^ “Full text of testimony”Milliyet (in Turkish). Retrieved 2008-09-04.
  15. Jump up^ Today’s Zaman, 19 August 2013, AK Party to ask for retrial by Constitutional Court
  16. Jump up^ “The battle for Turkey’s soul (Democracy v secularism in Turkey)”The Economist. 2007-05-03. Archived from the original on an unspecified date. Retrieved 2008-07-22.
  17. Jump up^ “Secular rally targets Turkish PM,” BBC News, April 14, 2007.
  18. Jump up^ “Turkey’s ruling party announces FM Gul as presidential candidate,” Xinhua, April 24, 2007.
  19. Jump up^ “More than one million rally in Turkey for secularism, democracy”Agence France-Presse. Retrieved 2007-04-29.
  20. Jump up^ “One million Turks rally against government”Reuters. 2007-04-29. Retrieved 2007-04-30.
  21. Jump up^ “Saylan: Manisa mitingi önemli”Milliyet (in Turkish). Retrieved 2007-05-04.
  22. Jump up^ “Turks protest ahead of early elections”Swissinfo. Archived from the original on September 30, 2007. Retrieved 2007-05-13.
  23. Jump up^ “Turkey: 22 July 2007 – Election Results”BBC Turkish. 2007-07-23. Retrieved 2008-07-22.
  24. Jump up^ International / Europe. “Turkish local elections, 2009”. NTV-MSNBC. 2009-03-29. Retrieved 2009-03-29.
  25. Jump up^ “AKP’nin Anayasa hedefi 15 madde”NTVMSNBC. 2009-02-17. Retrieved 2009-02-17.
  26. Jump up^ HSP dissolves itself as its leader plans to join the ruling party
  27. Jump up^ “Less than white?”The Economist. 2008-09-18. Retrieved 2008-09-22.
  28. Jump up^ “AK Parti mi, AKP mi? (AK Parti or AKP?)”Habertürk (in Turkish). 2009-06-05. Retrieved 2009-08-10.
  29. Jump up^ Ebru Toktar and Ersin Bal. “Laiklik anlayışlarımız farklı” (Turkish). Akşam, 2008-05-07.
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Muslim Brotherhood

Muslim Brotherhood

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Muslim Brotherhood
الإخوان المسلمون
al-ʾIkḫwān al-Muslimūn
IPA: [ʔælʔɪxˈwæːn ʔælmʊslɪˈmuːn]
Muslim Brotherhood Logo.png
Leader Mohammed Badie

Mahmmoud Ezzat (Acting)

Spokesperson Gehad el-Haddad
Founded 1928
Ismailia, Egypt
Headquarters Cairo, Egypt
Ideology Sunni Islamism
Religious conservatism

The Society of the Muslim Brothers  (Arabic: جماعة الإخوان المسلمين‎, الإخوان المسلمون, the Muslim Brotherhoodtransliteratedal-ʾIkḫwān al-Muslimūn) is a transnational Islamic political organization. Founded in Egypt in 1928[1] as a Pan-Islamic, religious, andsocial movement by the Islamic scholar and schoolteacher Hassan al-Banna,[2][3][4][5] by the end of World War II the Muslim Brotherhood had an estimated two million members.[6] Its ideas had gained supporters throughout the Arab world and influenced other Islamist groups with its “model of political activism combined with Islamic charity work”.[7]

The Brotherhood’s stated goal is to instill the Qur’an and Sunnah as the “sole reference point for …ordering the life of the Muslim family, individual, community … and state.”[citation needed] The movement officially renounced political violence in 1949, after a period of considerable political tension which ended in the assassination of Egyptian Prime Minister Mahmoud an-Nukrashi Pashaby a young veterinary student who was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood.[8][9][10]

The Muslim Brotherhood is financed by contributions from its members, who are required to allocate a portion of their income to the movement. Some of these contributions are from members who work in Saudi Arabia and other oil-rich countries.[11]

The Muslim Brotherhood started as a religious social organization; preaching Islam, teaching the illiterate, setting up hospitals and even launching commercial enterprises. As its influence grew, it began to oppose British rule in Egypt, starting in 1936.[12] Many Egyptian nationalists accuse the Muslim Brotherhood of violent killings during this period.[13] After the Arab defeat in the First Arab-Israeli war, the Egyptian government dissolved the organization and arrested its members.[12] The Muslim Brotherhood supported the Egyptian Revolution of 1952, but after being implicated in an attempted assassination of Egypt’s president it was once again banned and repressed.[14] The Muslim Brotherhood has been suppressed in other countries as well, most notably in Syria in 1982 during the Hama massacre.[15]

The Arab Spring at first brought considerable success for the Brotherhood, but as of 2013 it has suffered severe reverses.[16]After some six decades of government repression, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood was legalized in 2011 when the regime ofHosni Mubarak was overthrown. As the country’s strongest political organization, the Brotherhood won several elections,[17]including the 2012 presidential election when its candidate Mohamed Morsi became Egypt’s first democratically elected President. However one year later, on 3 July 2013, Morsi was himself overthrown by the military and the organization is once again suffering a severe crackdown.[18]




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The Brotherhood’s credo was and is, “Allah is our objective; the Quran is our law, the Prophet is our leader; Jihad is our way; and dying in the way of Allah is the highest of our aspirations.”[19][20] The submission of the brotherhood’s members under these credo accords to their absolute obedience to the Muslim Brotherhood’s leadership.[21] The Brotherhood’s English language website describes the principles of the Muslim Brotherhood as including firstly the introduction of the Islamic Sharia as “the basis for controlling the affairs of state and society” and secondly, work to unify “Islamic countries and states, mainly among the Arab states, and liberating them from foreign imperialism”.[22]

According to a spokesman, the Muslim Brotherhood believe in reform, democracy, freedom of assemblypress, etc.

We believe that the political reform is the true and natural gateway for all other kinds of reform. We have announced our acceptance of democracy that acknowledges political pluralism, the peaceful rotation of power and the fact that the nation is the source of all powers. As we see it, political reform includes the termination of the state of emergency, restoring public freedoms, including the right to establish political parties, whatever their tendencies may be, and the freedom of the press, freedom of criticism and thought, freedom of peaceful demonstrations, freedom of assembly, etc. It also includes the dismantling of all exceptional courts and the annulment of all exceptional laws, establishing the independence of the judiciary, enabling the judiciary to fully and truly supervise general elections so as to ensure that they authentically express people’s will, removing all obstacles that restrict the functioning of civil society organizations, etc.[23]

Its founder, Hassan Al-Banna, was influenced by Islamic reformers Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida, with the group itself being influenced by Sufism.[24][25] In the group’s belief, the Quran and Sunnah constitute a perfect way of life and social and political organization that God has set out for man. Islamic governments must be based on this system and eventually unified in aCaliphate. The Muslim Brotherhood’s goal, as stated by Brotherhood founder Hassan al-Banna was to reclaim Islam’s manifest destiny, an empire, stretching from Spain to Indonesia.[26] It preaches that Islam enjoins man to strive for social justice, the eradication of poverty and corruption, and political freedom to the extent allowed by the laws of Islam. The Brotherhood strongly opposes Western colonialism, and helped overthrow the pro-western monarchies in Egypt and other Muslim countries during the early 20th century.

On the issue of women and gender the Muslim Brotherhood interprets Islam conservatively. Its founder called for “a campaign against ostentation in dress and loose behavior”, “segregation of male and female students”, a separate curriculum for girls, and “the prohibition of dancing and other such pastimes … “[27]

The Muslim Brotherhood is a movement, not a political party, but members have created political parties in several countries, such as the Islamic Action Front in Jordan and Hamas in Gaza and the West Bank and the newly created Freedom and Justice Party in Egypt. These parties are staffed by Brotherhood members but kept independent from the Muslim Brotherhood to some degree, unlike Hizb ut-Tahrir which is highly centralized.[28]

There are breakaway groups from the movement, including the Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya and Al Takfir Wal Hijra.[29] Osama bin Laden criticized the Brotherhood, and accused it of betraying jihad and the ideals of Sayyid Qutb, an influential Brother member and author of Milestones.[30][31]


From the Transcripts[32] the following hierarchical Organisation structure can be derived:

  • The Shura Council has the duties of planning, charting general policies and programs that achieve the goal of the Group. Its resolutions are binding to the Group and only the General Organisational Conference can modify or annul them and the Shura Office has also the right to modify or annul resolutions of the Executive Office. It follows the implementation of the Group policies and programs. It directs the Executive Office and it forms dedicated branch committees to assist in that.[33]
  • Executive Office (Guidance Office) with its leader the General Masul (General Guide) and its members, both appointed by the Shura Office, has to follow up and guide the activities of the General Organisation. It submits a periodical report to the Shura Council about its work and of the activity of the domestic bodies and the general organisations. It distributes its duties to its members according to the internal by-laws.

It has the following divisions (not complete): – Executive leadership – Organizational office – Secretariat general – Educational office – Political office – Sisters office

The Muslim Brotherhood aimed to build a transnational organization, founding groups in Lebanon (in 1936), Syria (1937), and Transjordan (1946). It also recruited among the foreign students in Cairo where its headquarters became a center and meeting place for representatives from the whole Muslim world.[citation needed]

In each country there is a Branch committee with a Masul (leader) appointed by the General Executive leadership with essentially the same Branch-divisions as the Executive office has. To the duties of every branch belong fundraising, infiltrating and overtaking other Muslim organisations for the sake of uniting the Muslims to dedicate them to the general goals of the Muslim Brotherhood.

In Egypt


Hassan al-Banna founded the Muslim Brotherhood in the city of Ismailia in March 1928 along with six workers of the Suez Canal Company, as a Pan-Islamic, religious, political, and social movement.[34] The Suez Canal Company helped Banna build the mosque in Ismailia that would serve as the Brotherhood’s headquarters, according to Richard Mitchell’s The Society of Muslim Brothers.[35] According to al-Banna, contemporary Islam had lost its social dominance, because most Muslims had been corrupted by Western influences. Sharia law based on the Qur’an and the Sunnah were seen as laws passed down by God that should be applied to all parts of life, including the organization of the government and the handling of everyday problems.[citation needed]

Al-Banna was populist in his message of protecting workers against the tyranny of foreign and monopolist companies. It founded social institutions such as hospitals, pharmacies, schools, etc. Al-Banna held highly conservative views on issues such as women’s rights, opposing equal rights for women, but supporting the establishment of justice towards women.[27] The Brotherhood grew rapidly going from 800 members in 1936, to 200,000 by 1938, 500,000 in 1948.

Post–World War II

Muslim Brotherhood fighters in the1948 Arab–Israeli War

In November 1948, following several bombings and assassination attempts, the Egyptian government arrested 32 leaders of the Brotherhood’s “secret apparatus” and banned the Brotherhood.[36] At this time the Brotherhood was estimated to have 2000 branches and 500,000 members or sympathizers.[37] In succeeding months Egypt’s prime minister was assassinated by a Brotherhood member, and following that Al-Banna himself was assassinated in what is thought to be a cycle of retaliation.

In 1952, members of the Muslim Brotherhood were accused of taking part in the Cairo Fire that destroyed some 750 buildings in downtown Cairo – mainly night clubs, theatres, hotels, and restaurants frequented by British and other foreigners.[38]

In 1952 Egypt’s monarchy was overthrown by a group of nationalist military officers (Free Officers Movement) who had formed a cell within the Brotherhood during the first war against Israel in 1948.[39] However after the revolution Gamal Abdel Nasser, the leader of the ‘free officers’ cell, after deposing the first President of Egypt, Muhammad Neguib, in a coup, quickly moved against the Brotherhood, blaming them for an attempt on his life. The Brotherhood was again banned and this time thousands of its members were imprisoned, many being tortured and held for years in prisons and concentration camps. In the 1950s and 1960s many Brotherhood members sought sanctuary in Saudi Arabia.[40]

In the 1970s after the death of Nasser and under the new President (Anwar Sadat), the Egyptian Brotherhood was invited back to Egypt and began a new phase of participation in Egyptian politics.[41] Imprisoned Brethren were released and the organization was tolerated to varying degrees with periodic arrests and crackdowns until the2011 Revolution.


During the Mubarak era, observers both defended and criticized the Brotherhood. It was the largest opposition group in Egypt, calling for “Islamic reform”, and a democratic system in Egypt. It had built a vast network of support through Islamic charities working among poor Egyptians.[42] According to ex-Knesset member and author Uri Avnery the Brotherhood was religious but pragmatic, “deeply embedded in Egyptian history, more Arab and more Egyptian than fundamentalist.” It formed “an old established party which has earned much respect with its steadfastness in the face of recurrent persecution, torture, mass arrests and occasional executions. Its leaders are untainted by the prevalent corruption, and admired for their commitment to social work.”[43] It also developed a significant movement online.[44][45]

In the 2005 parliamentary elections, the Brotherhood became “in effect, the first opposition party of Egypt’s modern era.” Despite electoral irregularities, including the arrest of hundreds of Brotherhood members, and having to run its candidates as independents (the party being technically illegal), the Brotherhood won 88 seats (20% of the total) compared to 14 seats for the legal opposition.[46]

During its term in parliament the Brotherhood “posed a democratic political challenge to the regime, not a theological one,” according to one The New York Times journalist,[46]while another report praised it for attempting to transform “the Egyptian parliament into a real legislative body”, that represented citizens and kept the government “accountable”.[46][47]

But fears remained about its commitment to democracy, equal rights, and freedom of expression and belief—or lack thereof.[48] In December 2006, a campus demonstration by Brotherhood students in uniforms, demonstrating martial arts drills, betrayed to some such as Jameel Theyabi “the group’s intent to plan for the creation of militia structures, and a return by the group to the era of ‘secret cells'”.[49] Another report highlighted the Muslim Brotherhood’s efforts in Parliament to combat what one member called the `current US-led war against Islamic culture and identity,’ forcing the Minister of Culture (Farouk Hosny) to ban the publication of three novels on the ground they promoted blasphemy and unacceptable sexual practices.[50] In October 2007, the Muslim Brotherhood issued a detailed political platform. Amongst other things it called for a board of Muslim clerics to oversee the government, and limiting the office of the presidency to Muslim men. In the “Issues and Problems” chapter of the platform, it declared that a woman was not suited to be president because the post’s religious and military duties “conflict with her nature, social and other humanitarian roles.” While proclaiming “equality between men and women in terms of their human dignity,” the document warned against “burdening women with duties against their nature or role in the family.”[51]

Internally, some leaders in the Brotherhood disagreed on whether to adhere to Egypt’s 32-year peace treaty with Israel. A deputy leader declared the Brotherhood would seek dissolution of the treaty,[52] while a Brotherhood spokesman stated the Brotherhood would respect the treaty as long as “Israel shows real progress on improving the lot of the Palestinians.”[53]

2011 revolution and after

Following the 2011 Egyptian revolution and fall of Hosni Mubarak, the Brotherhood was legalized[54] and was at first very successful, dominating the 2011 parliamentary election and winning the 2012 presidential election, before the army overthrew President Mohamed Morsi a year later, and cracked down on the Brotherhood again.

On 30 April 2011, it launched a new party called the Freedom and Justice Party, which won 235 of the 498 seats in the 2011 Egyptian parliamentary elections, far more than any other party.[55][56] The party rejected the “candidacy of women or Copts for Egypt’s presidency”, but not for cabinet positions.[57]

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerrymeets with Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi, May 2013

The Muslim Brotherhood’s candidate for Egypt’s 2012 presidential election was Mohamed Morsi, who defeated Ahmed Shafiq—the last prime minister under Mubarak’s rule—with 51.73% of the vote.[58] Some high level supporters[59][60] and former Brotherhood officials[61] have reiterated hostility toward Zionism,[62] although during his campaign Morsi himself promised to stand for peaceful relations with Israel.[63]

Within a short period, serious public opposition developed to President Morsi. In late November 2012 he ‘temporarily’ granted himself the power to legislate without judicial oversight or review of his acts, on the grounds that he needed to “protect” the nation from the Mubarak-era power structure.[64][65] He also put a draft constitution to a referendum that opponents complained was “an Islamist coup.”[66] These issues[67]—and concerns over the prosecutions of journalists, the unleashing of pro-Brotherhood gangs on nonviolent demonstrators, the continuation of military trials, new laws that permitted detention without judicial review for up to 30 days,[68] and the seeming impunity given to Islamist radical attacks on Christians and other minorities[69]—brought hundreds of thousands of protesters to the streets starting in November 2012[70][71]

By April 2013, Egypt had “become increasingly divided” between President Mohammed Morsi and “Islamist allies” and an opposition of “moderate Muslims, Christians and liberals”. Opponents accused “Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood of seeking to monopolize power, while Morsi’s allies say the opposition is trying to destabilize the country to derail the elected leadership”.[72] Adding to the unrest were severe fuel shortages and electricity outages—which evidence suggests were orchestrated by Mubarak-era Egyptian elites.[73]

On 3 July 2013 Mohamed Morsi was arrested and detained by the military following a period of widespread protests of somewhere between 17 and 33 million Egyptians[69][74][75][76] demanding the resignation of Morsi. Thousands also protested in support of Morsi.[77]

On 14 August, the military declared a month-long state of emergency and commenced raids against Brotherhood protest encampments. Violence escalated rapidly and led to the deaths of over 600 people and injury of some 4000.[78][79] In retaliation Brotherhood supporters looted and burned police stations and dozens of churches.[80] The crackdown that followed has been called the worst for the Brotherhood’s organization “in eight decades”.[81] By 19 August, al Jazeera reported that “most” of the Brotherhood’s leaders were in custody.[82][83] On that day Supreme Leader (Mohammed Badie) was arrested,[84] crossing a “red line”, as even Hosni Mubarak had never arrested him.[85] On 23 September, a court ordered the group outlawed and its assets seized.[86]

General leaders

Mohammed Badie, the current leader

In West Asia


In Bahrain, the Muslim Brotherhood is represented by the Al Eslah Society and its political wing, the Al-Menbar Islamic Society. Following parliamentary elections in 2002, Al Menbar became the largest joint party with eight seats in the forty seat Chamber of Deputies. Prominent members of Al Menbar include Dr Salah Abdulrahman, Dr. Salah Al Jowder, and outspoken MP Mohammed Khalid. The party has generally backed government sponsored legislation on economic issues, but has sought a clampdown on pop concerts, sorcery and soothsayers. It has strongly opposed the government’s accession to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on the grounds that this would give Muslim citizens the right to change religion, when in the party’s view they should be “beheaded”.[87]

In March 2009, the Shi’a group The Islamic Enlightenment Society held its annual conference with the announced aim of diffusing tension between Muslim branches. The society invited national Sunni and Shi’a scholars to participate. Bahraini independent Salafi religious scholars Sheikh Salah Al Jowder and Sheikh Rashid Al Muraikhi, and Shi’a clerics Sheikh Isa Qasim and Abdulla Al Ghoraifi spoke about the importance of sectarian cooperation. Additional seminars were held throughout the year.[88]

In 2010, the U.S. government sponsored the visit of Al-Jowder, described as a prominent Sunni cleric, to the United States for a three-week interfaith dialogue program in several cities.[89][90]


The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria was founded in the 1930s (according to or in 1945, a year before independence from France, (according to journalist Robin Wright). In the first decade or so of independence it was part of the legal opposition, and in the 1961 parliamentary elections it won ten seats (5.8% of the house). But after the 1963 coup that brought the Baath Party to power it was banned.[91] It played a major role in the mainly Sunni-based movement that opposed the secularistpan-Arabist Baath party. This conflict developed into an armed struggle that continued until culminating in the Hama uprising of 1982, when the rebellion was crushed by the military.[92]

Membership in the Syrian Brotherhood became a capital offence in Syria in 1980 (under Emergency Law 49, which was revoked in 2011), but the headquarters of the Muslim Brotherhood-linked Palestinian group, Hamas, was located in the Syria’s capital Damascus, where it was given Syrian government support. This has been cited as an example of the lack of international centralisation or even coordination of the Muslim Brotherhood.[93]

The Brotherhood is said to have “resurrected itself” and become “dominant group” in the opposition by 2012 the Syrian civil war against the Assad regime according to theWashington Post newspaper.[94] But by 2013 another source described it as having “virtually no influence on the conflict”.[95] Syrian President Bashar Assad welcomed the fall of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and remarked “Arab identity is back on the right track after the fall from power of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, which had used religion for its own political gain.”[96]


The Jordanian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood was formed in 1942, and is a strong factor in Jordanian politics. While most political parties and movements were banned for a long time in Jordan such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, the Brotherhood was exempted and allowed to operate by the Jordanian monarchy. The Jordanian Brotherhood has formed its own political party, the Islamic Action Front, which has the largest number of seats of any party in the Jordanian parliament.[97]

The Muslim Brotherhood is playing an active role in the unrest in several Arab countries in January 2011. For example, at a rally held outside the Egyptian Embassy in Amman on Saturday, 29 January 2011 with some 100 participants, Hammam Saeed, head of the Muslim Brotherhood of Jordan and a close ally of the Hamas’s Damascus-based leader, Khaled Meshaal, said: “Egypt’s unrest will spread across the Mideast and Arabs will topple leaders allied with the United States.” However, he did not specifically name Jordanian King Abdullah II.[98] The Muslim brotherhood is rightfully or wrongfully feared by several commentators in the west, however it is not known how many seats in a democratic government the brotherhood will gain in any of the aforementioned countries.

As of late 2013, the movement in Jordan was described as being in “disarray”.[99]


Although Iran is a predominately Shia Muslim country and the Muslim Brotherhood is Sunni in doctrine, Olga Davidson and Mohammad Mahallati claim the Brotherhood has had influence among Shia in Iran.[100] Navab Safavi, who founded Fada’iyan-e Islam, (also Fedayeen of Islam, or Fadayan-e Islam), an Iranian Islamic organization active in Iran in the 1940s and 1950s, “was highly impressed by the Muslim Brotherhood.[101] From 1945 to 1951 the Fadain assassinated several high level Iranian personalities and officials who they believed to be un-Islamic. They included anti-clerical writer Ahmad Kasravi, Premier Haj Ali Razmara, former Premier Abdolhossein Hazhir, and Education and Culture Minister Ahmad Zangeneh.[102]

At that time Navab Safavi now based in the UK where associates and allies of Ayatollah Khomeini who went on to become a figure in the Iranian Revolution of 1979.[102]Khomeini and other religious figures in Iran worked to establish Islamic unity and downplay Shia-Sunni differences.[citation needed]


The Iraqi Islamic Party was formed in 1960 as the Iraqi branch of the Brotherhood,[103] but was banned from 1961 during the nationalist rule of Abd al-Karim Qasim. As government repression hardened under the Baath Party from February 1963, the group was forced to continue underground. After the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime in 2003, the Islamic Party has reemerged as one of the main advocates of the country’s Sunni community. The Islamic Party has been sharply critical of the U.S.-led occupation of Iraq, but participates in the political process.[104] Its leader is Iraqi Vice-President Tariq Al-Hashimi.

Also, in the north of Iraq there are several Islamic movements inspired by or part of the Muslim Brotherhood network. The Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU) holds seats in the Kurdish parliament, and is the main political force outside the dominance of the two main secularist parties, the PUK and KDP.[105]

Mandate of Palestine and the Palestinian Territories

‘Abd al-Rahman al-Banna, the brother of the Muslim Brotherhood founder Hasan al-Banna, went to the British Mandate for Palestine and established the Muslim Brotherhood there in 1935. Al-Hajj Amin al-Husseini, eventually appointed by the British as Grand Mufti of Jerusalem in hopes of accommodating him, was the leader of the group in Palestine.[106] Another important leader associated with the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine was ‘Izz al-Din al-Qassam, an inspiration to Islamists because he had been the first to lead an armed resistance in the name of Palestine against the British in 1935.[107] In 1945, the group established a branch in Jerusalem, and by 1947 twenty-five more branches had sprung up, in towns such as JaffaLodHaifaNablus, and Tulkarm, which total membership between 12,000 to 20,000.

Brotherhood members fought alongside the Arab armies during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, and, after Israel’s creation, the ensuing Palestinian refugee crisis encouraged more Palestinian Muslims to join the group. After the war, in the West Bank, the group’s activity was mainly social and religious, not political, so it had relatively good relations with Jordan, which was in control of the West Bank after 1950. In contrast, the group frequently clashed with the Egyptian regime that controlled the Gaza Strip until 1967.[108]

In the 1950s and 1960s, the Brotherhood’s goal was “the upbringing of an Islamic generation” through the restructuring of society and religious education, rather than opposition to Israel, and so it lost popularity to insurgent movements and the presence of Hizb ut-Tahrir.[109] Eventually, however, the Brotherhood was strengthened by several factors:

  1. The creation of al-Mujamma’ al-Islami, the Islamic Center in 1973 by Shaykh Ahmad Yasin had a centralizing effect that encapsulated all religious organizations.
  2. The Muslim Brotherhood Society in Jordan and Palestine was created from a merger of the branches in the West Bank and Gaza and Jordan.
  3. Palestinian disillusion with the Palestinian militant groups caused them to become more open to alternatives.
  4. The Islamic Revolution in Iran offered inspiration to Palestinians. The Brotherhood was able to increase its efforts in Palestine and avoid being dismantled like militant groups because it did not focus on the occupation. While militant groups were being dismantled, the Brotherhood filled the void.[110]

After the 1967 Six Day War, Israel may have looked to cultivate political Islam as a counterweight to Fatah, the main secular Palestinian nationalist political organization.[111][112] Between 1967 and 1987, the year Hamas was founded, the number of mosques in Gaza tripled from 200 to 600, and the Muslim Brotherhood named the period between 1975 and 1987 a phase of ‘social institution building.’[113] During that time, the Brotherhood established associations, used zakat (alms giving) for aid to poor Palestinians, promoted schools, provided students with loans, used waqf (religious endowments) to lease property and employ people, and established mosques. Likewise, antagonistic and sometimes violent opposition to Fatah, the Palestine Liberation Organization and other secular nationalist groups increased dramatically in the streets and on university campuses.[111]

In 1987, following the Intifada, the Islamic Resistance Movement, or Hamas[110][114] was established from Brotherhood-affiliated charities and social institutions that had gained a strong foothold among the local population. During the First Intifada (1987–93), Hamas militarized and transformed into one of the strongest Palestinian militant groups.

The Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip in 2007 was the first time since the Sudanese coup of 1989 that brought Omar al-Bashir to power, that a Muslim Brotherhood group ruled a significant geographic territory.[115] However, the 2013 overthrow of the Mohammad Morsi government in Egypt significantly weakened Hamas’s position, leading to a blockade of Gaza and economic crisis.[95]

Saudi Arabia

The Muslim Brotherhood’s brand of Islam and Islamic politics differs from the strict Salafi creed, Wahhabiyya, officially held by the state of Saudi Arabia. Despite this, the Brotherhood has been tolerated by the Saudi government, and maintains a presence in the country.[citation needed] Aside from tolerating the Brotherhood organization[citation needed], and according to Washington Post report, the then Saudi Interior Minister Prince Nayef denounced the Brotherhood, saying it was guilty of “betrayal of pledges and ingratitude” and was “the source of all problems in the Islamic world”.[11]


The Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait is represented in the Kuwaiti parliament by Hadas.[116][117]


The Muslim Brotherhood is the political arm of the Yemeni Congregation for Reform, commonly known as Islah. Former President Ali Abdullah Saleh made a lot of effort to entrench the accusations of being in league with Al Qaeda, but he failed to present any, even a weak, evidence to support his claims.[118]


Sultan Qaboos bin Said al Said of Oman claimed that the Muslim Brotherhood obtained support from the uneducated people.[119]

Elsewhere in Africa


The Justice and Development Party was the largest vote-getter in Morocco’s 2011 election, and as of October 2013, held the office of Prime Minister.[16] It is historically affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood[120] ,[121] however, despite this, the party has reportedly “ostentatiously” praised the King of Morocco, while “loudly insisting that it is in no sense whatsoever a Muslim Brotherhood party”[16]—a development one source (Hussein Ibish), calls evidence of how “regionally discredited the movement has become.”


The Muslim Brotherhood reached Algeria during the later years of the French colonial presence in the country (1830–1962). Sheikh Ahmad Sahnoun led the organization in Algeria between 1953 and 1954 during the French colonialism. Brotherhood members and sympathizers took part in the uprising against France in 1954–1962, but the movement was marginalized during the largely secular FLN one-party rule which was installed at independence in 1962. It remained unofficially active, sometimes protesting the government and calling for increased Islamization and Arabization of the country’s politics.

When a multi-party system was introduced in Algeria in the early 1990s, the Muslim Brotherhood formed the Movement for the Society of Peace (MSP, previously known as Hamas), led by Mahfoud Nahnah until his death in 2003 (he was succeeded by present party leader Boudjerra Soltani). The Muslim Brotherhood in Algeria did not join theFront islamique du salut (FIS), which emerged as the leading Islamist group, winning the 1991 elections and which was banned in 1992 following a military coup d’état, although some Brotherhood sympathizers did. The Brotherhood subsequently also refused to join the violent post-coup uprising by FIS sympathizers and the Armed Islamic Groups(GIA) against the Algerian state and military which followed, and urged a peaceful resolution to the conflict and a return to democracy. It has thus remained a legal political organization and enjoyed parliamentary and government representation. In 1995, Sheikh Nahnah ran for President of Algeria finishing second with 25.38% of the popular vote. During the 2000s (decade), the party—led by Nahnah’s successor Boudjerra Soltani—has been a member of a three-party coalition backing President Abdelaziz Bouteflika.


Until the election of Hamas in Gaza, Sudan was the one country were the Brotherhood was most successful in gaining power, its members making up a large part of the government officialdom following the 1989 coup d’état by General Omar Hassan al-Bashir.

Always close to Egyptian politics, Sudan has had a Muslim Brotherhood presence since 1949. In 1945, a delegation from the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt visited Sudan and held various meetings inside the country advocating and explaining their ideology. Sudan has a long and deep history with the Muslim Brotherhood compared to many other countries. By April 1949, the first branch of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood organization emerged. However, simultaneously, many Sudanese students studying in Egypt were introduced to the ideology of the Brotherhood. The Muslim student groups also began organizing in the universities during the 1940s, and the Brotherhood’s main support base has remained to be college educated. In order to unite them, in 1954, a conference was held, attended by various representatives from different groups that appeared to have the same ideology. The conference voted to establish a Unified Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood Organization based on the teachings of Imam Hassan Al-banna.

An offshoot of the Sudanese branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic Charter Front grew during the 1960, with Islamic scholar Hasan al-Turabi becoming its Secretary general in 1964. The Islamic Charter Front (ICM) was renamed several times most recently being called the National Islamic Front (NIF). Turabi has been the prime architect of the NIF as a modern Islamist party. He worked within the Institutions of the government, which led to a prominent position of his organization in the country. NIF supported women’s right to vote and ran women candidates. The Muslim Brotherhood/NIF’s main objective in Sudan was to Islamize the society “from above” and to institutionalize the Islamic law throughout the country where they succeeded.

The Brotherhood penetrated into the ruling political organizations, the state army and security personal, the national and regional assemblies of Sudan. They also launched their own mass organizations among the youth and women such as the shabab al-binna, and raidat al-nahda, and launched educational campaigns to Islamize the communities throughout the country. At the same time, they gained control of several newly founded Islamic missionary and relief organizations to spread their ideology. The Brotherhood members took control of the newly established Islamic Banks as directors, administrators, employees and legal advisors, which became a source of power for the Brotherhood.

The Sudanese government has come under considerable criticism for its human rights policies, links to terrorist groups, and war in southern Sudan and Darfur.

The conservatism of at least some elements of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood was highlighted in an 3 August 2007 Al-Jazeera television interview of Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood leader Sheikh Sadeq Abdallah bin Al-Majed. As translated by the Israeli-based MEMRI, Bin Al-Majed told his interviewer that “the West, and the Americans in particular … are behind all the tragedies that are taking place in Darfur“, as they “realized that it Darfur is full of treasures”; that “Islam does not permit a non-Muslim to rule over Muslims;” and that he had issued a fatwa prohibiting the vaccination of children, on the grounds that the vaccinations were “a conspiracy of the Jews andFreemasons“.[122]


Somalia’s wing of the Muslim Brotherhood is known by the name Harakat Al-Islah or “Reform Movement”. Nonetheless, the Brotherhood, as mentioned earlier, has inspired many Islamist organizations in Somalia. Muslim Brotherhood ideology reached Somalia in the early 1960s, but Al-Islah movement was formed in 1978 and slowly grew in the 1980s. Al-Islah has been described as “a generally nonviolent and modernizing Islamic movement that emphasizes the reformation and revival of Islam to meet the challenges of the modern world”, whose “goal is the establishment of an Islamic state” and which “operates primarily in Mogadishu”.[123]

The founders of the Islah Movement are: Sh. Mohamed Ahmed Nur, Dr. Ali Sheikh Ahmed, Dr. Mohamed Yusuf Abdi, Sh. Ahmed Rashid Hanafi, and Sh. Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah. The organization structured itself loosely and was not openly visible on the political scene of Somali society.

They chose to remain a secret movement fearing the repressive regime of Siad Barre but are considered the first ever opposition to the dictatorship. However, they emerged from secrecy when the regime collapsed in 1991 and started working openly thereafter. Most Somalis were surprised to see the new group they had never heard of, which was in the country since the 1970s in secrecy.

According to the Islah by-law, every five years the organization has to elect its Consultative (Shura) Council which elects the chairman and the two Vice-chairman. During the last 30 years, four chairmen were elected. These are Sheikh Mohamed Geryare (1978–1990), Dr. Mohamed Ali Ibrahim (1990–1999), Dr. Ali Sheikh Ahmed (1999–2008) and Dr. Ali Bashi Omar Roraye (2008–2013).

Dr. Ali Bashi is a medical doctor, a former university professor and a member of the transitional parliament (2000–2008). During the 1990s, Al-Islah devoted much effort to humanitarian efforts and providing free basic social services.

The leaders of Al-Islah played a key role in the educational network and establishing Mogadishu University. Through their network, they educate more than 120,000 students in the city of Mogadishu. Many other secondary schools such as the University of East Africa in Bosasso, Puntland, are externally funded and administered through organizations affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Islamic organization Al-Islah.[123] In Somalia, they are known to be a peaceful organization that does not participate in any factional fighting and rejects the use of violence.

Today the group’s membership includes urban professionals and students. According to a Crisis Group Report, Somalia’s Islamists, “Al-Islah organization is dominated by a highly educated urban elite whose professional, middle class status and extensive expatriate experiences are alien to most Somalis.”

Although Al-Islah have been criticized by some hardcore Islamists who considered them to be influenced by imperialist western values, Al-Islah speaks of democratic peaceful Somalia. They promote women’s rights, human rights, and other ideas, which they argue that these concepts originate from Islamic concepts. Al-Islah is gaining momentum in the Somali societies for their humanitarian work and moderate view of Islam, which is compatible to modernisation and respect of human rights. Currently, Islah initiated to establish political party under the name of Justice and Unity Party which is open for all citizens of Somalia.


Like their counterparts elsewhere in the Islamic world in general, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood has influenced the Tunisia’s Islamists. One of the notable organization that was influenced and inspired by the Brotherhood is Ennahda (The Revival or Renaissance Party), which is Tunisia’s major Islamist political grouping. An Islamist founded the organization in 1981. While studying in Damascus and Paris, Rashid Ghannouchi embraced the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood, which he disseminated on his return to Tunisia.


The Libyan branch of the Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1949, but it was not able to operate openly until after the 2011 Libyan civil war. It held its first public press conference on 17 November 2011, and on 24 December the Brotherhood announced that it would form the Justice and Construction Party (JCP) and contest the General National Congress elections the following year.[124][125]

Despite predictions based on fellow post-Arab Spring nations Tunisia and Egypt that the Brotherhood’s party would easily win the elections, it instead came a distant second to the National Forces Alliance, receiving just 10% of the vote and 17 out of 80 party-list seats.[126] Their candidate for Prime Minister, Awad al-Baraasi was also defeated in the first round of voting in September, although he was later made a Deputy Prime Minister under Ali Zeidan.[127][128] A JCP Congressman, Saleh Essaleh is also the vice speaker of the General National Congress.[129]


Changes to the demographic and political makeup of Mauritania in the 1970s heavily contributed to the growth of Islamism within Mauritanian society. Periods of severe drought resulted in urbanization, as large numbers of Mauritanians moved from the countryside to the cities, particularly Nouakchott, to escape the drought. This sharp increase in urbanization resulted in new civil associations being formed, and Mauritania’s first Islamist organisation, known as Jemaa Islamiyya (Islamic Association) was formed by Mauritanians sympathetic to the Muslim Brotherhood.[130]

There was increased activism relating to the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1980s, partially driven by members of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.[130]

In 2007 the National Rally for Reform and Development, better known as Tewassoul, was legalized as a political party. The party is associated with the Mauritanian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood.[130]

Other states

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Russian Federation

The Muslim Brotherhood is banned in Russia as a terrorist organisation.[131][132]

As affirmed on 14 February 2003 by the decision of the Supreme Court of Russia, the Muslim Brotherhood coordinated the creation of an Islamic organisation called The Supreme Military Majlis ul-Shura of the United Forces of Caucasian Mujahedeen (RussianВысший военный маджлисуль шура объединённых сил моджахедов Кавказа), led by Ibn Al-Khattab and Basaev; an organisation that committed multiple terror-attack acts in Russia and was allegedly financed by drug trafficking, counterfeiting of coins and racketeering.[133]

According to the above-mention decision of the Supreme Court:

Muslim Brotherhood is an organisation, basing its activities on the ideas of its theorists and leaders Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb with an aim of destruction of non-Islamic governments and the establishment of the worldwide Islamic government by the reconstruction of the “Great Islamic Caliphate”; firstly, in regions with majority of Muslim population, including those in Russia and CIS countries. The organisation is illegal in some Middle East countries (Syria, Jordan). The main forms of activities are warlike Islamism propaganda with intolerance to other religions, recruitment in mosques, armed Jihad without territorial boundaries. The Supreme Court of Russia[133]

United States

According to The Washington Post, U.S. Muslim Brotherhood supporters “make up the U.S. Islamic community’s most organized force” by running hundreds of mosques and business ventures, promoting civic activities, and setting up American Islamic organizations to defend and promote Islam.[134] In 1963, the U.S. chapter of Muslim Brotherhood was started by activists involved with the Muslim Students Association (MSA).[11] U.S. supporters of the Brotherhood also started other organizations including: North American Islamic Trust in 1971, the Islamic Society of North America in 1981, the American Muslim Council in 1990, the Muslim American Society in 1992 and the International Institute of Islamic Thought in the 1980s.[11]

The aims of the Brotherhood in America are:

“The process of settlement is a “Civilization-Jihadist Process” with all the word means. The Ikhwan must understand that their work in America is a kind of grand Jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within and “sabotaging” its miserable house by their hands and the hands of the believers so that it is eliminated and God’s religion is made victorious over all other religions.

—’An Explanatory Memorandum on the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America,’ 1981[135]

United Kingdom

In 1996, the first representative of the Muslim Brotherhood in Britain, Kamal el-Helbawy, an Egyptian, was able to say that “there are not many members here, but many Muslims in Britain intellectually support the aims of the Muslim Brotherhood.” He added that at that time, the object of the MB in Britain was only to disseminate information on Islam, Islamic issues and movements, and to rectify the distortions and misunderstandings created by “different forces against Islam”.[citation needed]

In September 1999, the Muslim Brotherhood opened a “global information centre” in London. A press notice published in Muslim News stated that it would “specialize in promoting the perspectives and stances of the Muslim Brotherhood, and [communicate] between Islamic movements and the global mass media.”


Several Party and organizations in Indonesia are linked or at least inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood, although none has a formal relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood. One of the Muslim Brotherhood linked Parties is PKS (Prosperous Justice Party) with 10% seats in the parliament based on the Indonesian legislative election, 2009. The PKS relationship with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood was confirmed by Yusuf al-Qaradawi, a prominent Muslim Brotherhood leader.[136] PKS is a member of current government coalition under President SBY with 3 ministers in the cabinet.


The Brotherhood was criticised by Ayman al-Zawahiri in 2007 for its refusal to advocate the violent overthrow of the Mubarak regime. Issam al-Aryan, a top Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood figure, denounced the al-Qaeda leader: “Zawahiri’s policy and preaching bore dangerous fruit and had a negative impact on Islam and Islamic movements across the world.”[137]

Dubai police chief, Dhahi Khalfan, accused Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood of an alleged plot to overthrow the UAE government. He referred to the Muslim Brotherhood as “dictators” who want “Islamist rule in all the Gulf States”.[138]


Numerous officials and reporters question the sincerity of the Muslim Brotherhood’s pronouncements. These critics include, but are not limited to:

  • According to FrontPage Magazine, a conservative publication, former U.S. White House counterterrorism chief Juan Zarate said: “The Muslim Brotherhood is a group that worries us not because it deals with philosophical or ideological ideas but because it defends the use of violence against civilians.”[139][140]
  • Miles Axe Copeland, Jr. -a prominent U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operative who was one of the founding members of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) under William Donovan– divulges the confessions of numerous members of the Muslim brotherhood that resulted from the harsh interrogations done against them by Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser, for their alleged involvement in the assassination attempt made against Nasser (an assassination attempt that many believe was staged by Nasser himself[141]), which revealed that the Muslim Brotherhood was merely a “guild” that fulfilled the goals of western interests: “Nor was that all. Sound beatings of the Moslem Brotherhood organizers who had been arrested revealed that the organization had been thoroughly penetrated, at the top, by the British, American, French and Soviet intelligence services, any one of which could either make active use of it or blow it up, whichever best suited its purposes. Important lesson: fanaticism is no insurance against corruption; indeed, the two are highly compatible.”[142]
  • Former U.S. Middle East peace envoy Dennis Ross, who told Asharq Alawsat newspaper that the Muslim Brotherhood is a global, not a local organization, governed by a Shura (Consultative) Council, which rejects cessation of violence in Israel, and supports violence to achieve its political objectives elsewhere too.[143]
  • The Interior Minister of Saudi Arabia, Prince Naif Ibn Abdul Aziz has stated that the Muslim Brotherhood organization was the cause of most problems in the Arab world. ‘The Brotherhood has done great damage to Saudi Arabia,’ he said. Prince Naif accused the foremost Islamist group in the Arab world of harming the interests of Muslims. ‘All our problems come from the Muslim Brotherhood. We have given too much support to this group…” “The Muslim Brotherhood has destroyed the Arab world,’ he said. ‘Whenever they got into difficulty or found their freedom restricted in their own countries, Brotherhood activists found refuge in the Kingdom which protected their lives… But they later turned against the Kingdom…’ The Muslim Brotherhood has links to groups across the Arab world, including Jordan’s main parliamentary opposition, the ‘Islamic Action Front,’ and the ‘Palestinian resistance movement, ‘Hamas.” The Interior Minister’s outburst against the Brotherhood came amid mounting criticism in the United States of Saudi Arabia’s longstanding support for Islamist groups around the world…”[144]

Conspiracy theories

Status of non-Muslims

  • In 1997 Muslim Brotherhood Supreme Guide Mustafa Mashhur told journalist Khalid Daoud[145] that he thought Egypt’s Coptic Christians and Orthodox Jews should pay the long-abandoned jizya poll tax, levied on non-Muslims in exchange for protection from the state, rationalized by the fact that non-Muslims are exempt from military service while it is compulsory for Muslims. He went on to say, “we do not mind having Christian members in the People’s Assembly… [T]he top officials, especially in the army, should be Muslims since we are a Muslim country… This is necessary because when a Christian country attacks the Muslim country and the army has Christian elements, they can facilitate our defeat by the enemy.”[146] According to The Guardian newspaper, the proposal caused an “uproar” among Egypt’s six million Coptic Christians and “the movement later backtracked.”[147]

Response to criticisms

According to authors writing in the Council on Foreign Relations magazine Foreign Affairs: “At various times in its history, the group has used or supported violence and has been repeatedly banned in Egypt for attempting to overthrow Cairo’s secular government. Since the 1970s, however, the Egyptian Brotherhood has disavowed violence and sought to participate in Egyptian politics.”[148] Jeremy Bowen, BBC Middle East editor, called it “conservative and non-violent”;[149] The Brotherhood has condemned terrorism and the 9/11 attacks.[150][151]

The Brotherhood itself denounces the “catchy and effective terms and phrases” like “fundamentalist” and “political Islam” which it claims are used by “Western Media” to pigeonhole the group, and points to its “15 Principles” for an Egyptian National Charter, including “freedom of personal conviction… opinion… forming political parties… public gatherings… free and fair elections…”[22]

Similarly, some analysts maintain that whatever the source of modern Jihadi terrorism and the actions and words of some rogue members, the Brotherhood now has little in common with radical Islamists and modern jihadists who often condemn the Brotherhood as too moderate. They also deny the existence of any centralized and secretive global Muslim Brotherhood leadership.[152] Some claim that the origins of modern Muslim terrorism are found in Wahhabi ideology, not that of the Muslim Brotherhood.[153][154]

According to anthropologist Scott Atran, the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood even in Egypt has been overstated by Western commentators. He estimates that it can count on only 100,000 militants (out of some 600,000 dues paying members) in a population of more than 80 million, and that such support as it does have among Egyptians—an often cited figure is 20 percent to 30 percent—is less a matter of true attachment than an accident of circumstance: secular opposition groups that might have countered it were suppressed for many decades, but in driving the Egyptian Revolution of 2011, a more youthful constellation of secular movements has emerged to threaten the Muslim Brotherhood’s dominance of the political opposition.[155] This has not yet been the case, however, as evidenced by the Brotherhood’s strong showing in national elections. Polls also indicate that majority of Egyptians and other Arab nations endorse laws based on “Sharia”. [156][157]

Foreign relations

On 29 June 2011, as the Brotherhood’s political power became more apparent and solidified following the 2011 Egyptian revolution, the United States announced that it would reopen formal diplomatic channels with the group, with whom it had suspended communication as a result of suspected terrorist activity. The next day, the Brotherhood’s leadership announced that they welcomed the diplomatic overture.[158]

In media

Main article: Al-Gama’a

See also


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  27. Jump up to:a b In his tract, “Toward the Light” in Five Tracts of Hasan Al-Banna, trans. by Charles Wendell (Berkeley, 1978), ISBN 0-520-09584-7 pp. 126f., Al-Banna writes:

    Following are the principal goals of reform grounded on the spirit of genuine Islam … Treatment of the problem of women in a way which combines the progressive and the protective, in accordance with Islamic teaching, so that this problem – one of the most important social problems – will not be abandoned to the biased pens and deviant notions of those who err in the directions of deficiency and excess … a campaign against ostentation in dress and loose behaviour; the instruction of women in what is proper, with particular strictness as regards female instructors, pupils, physicians, and students, and all those in similar categories … a review of the curricula offered to girls and the necessity of making them distinct from the boys’ curricula in many stages of education … segregation of male and female students; private meetings between men and women, unless within the permitted degrees of relationship, to be counted as a crime for which both will be censured … the encouragement of marriage and procreation, by all possible means; promulgation of legislation to protect and give moral support to the family, and to solve the problems of marriage … the closure of morally undesirable ballrooms and dance-halls, and the prohibition of dancing and other such pastimes ….

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  119. Jump up^ “US embassy cables: Oman sultan resists Iranian charm offensive”The Guardian(London). 28 November 2010.
  120. Jump up^ “RECOMMENDED READING: “The Fate Of Morocco’s Islamists””18 July 2013. Global Mulsiml Brotherhood Watch. Retrieved 8 October 2013.
  121. Jump up^ Justice and Development Party, Ikhwanweb, the Muslim Brotherhood’s official English language website.
  122. Jump up^ “Al-Jazeera Interviews – Muslim Brotherhood Leader in Sudan”.
  123. Jump up to:a b “International Religious Freedom Report 2004. Somalia”. 1 January 2004. Retrieved 28 November 2012.
  124. Jump up^ “Muslim Brotherhood goes public with Libya summit”Reuters. 17 November 2011.
  125. Jump up^ “Muslim Brotherhood to Contest Libyan Elections as Independent Party”The Tripoli Post. 24 December 2011.
  126. Jump up^ “National Congress party results”. Libya Herald. Retrieved 15 February 2013.
  127. Jump up^ Wahab, Ashraf Abdul; Cousins, Michel (12 September 2012). “Abushagur elected as Prime Minister”Libya Herald. Retrieved 15 February 2013.
  128. Jump up^ “Libyan Prime Minister Nominates His Government Line-Up”Tripoli Post. 30 October 2012.
  129. Jump up^ “National Congress elects two vice speakers”Libya Herald. 10 August 2012. Retrieved 15 February 2013.
  130. Jump up to:a b c Mauritania’s Islamists-Carnegie Middle East Center.
  131. Jump up^ (Russian) “Единый федеральный список организаций, признанных террористическими Верховным Судом Российской Федерации”Federal Security Service. Retrieved 13 April 2011.
  132. Jump up^ (Russian) “Постановление ГД ФС РФ от 12.02.2003 N 3624-III ГД “О Заявлении Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации “О пресечении деятельности террористических организаций на территории Российской Федерации” // “Собрание законодательства РФ”, 24.02.2003, N 8, ст. 720″ [Resolution of the State Duma, 2 December 2003 N 3624-III GD “on the Application of the State Duma of the Russian Federation” on the suppression of the activities of terrorist organisations on the territory of the Russian Federation].Consultant Plus.
  133. Jump up to:a b (Russian) “Решение ВС РФ о признании террористическими ряда иностранных организаций”. Справочно-информационный интернет-портал RELIGARE (“РЕЛИГИЯ и СМИ”). Retrieved 13 April 2011.
  134. Jump up^ In Search Of Friends Among The FoesThe Washington Post.
  135. Jump up^ “United States District Court, Northern District of Texas, “USA v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, ElBarasse Search-3.””US government. 9 January 2013. Retrieved 22 June 2013.
  136. Jump up^ Qaradhawi, DR. Yusuf (2001), Umat Islam Menyongsong Abad ke-21, Era Intermedia, Solo, ISBN 979-9183-56-1 pp. 92;
  137. Jump up^ Jones, Seth G. (2012). “Think Again: Al Qaeda”Foreign Policy (May/June 2012). Retrieved 28 April 2012.
  138. Jump up^ Muslim Brotherhood subversion in Gulf StatesThe Jerusalem Post.
  139. Jump up^ Ehrenfeld, Rachel and Lappen, Alyssa A., (16 June 2006) “The Truth about the Muslim Brotherhood”, FrontPage Magazine, citing Sylvain Besson, La Conquête De L’Occident: Le Projet Secret Des Islamistes, as quoted in Guitta, Olivier, (20 February 2006), “The Cartoon Jihad,”The Weekly Standard. Retrieved 1 March 2007.
  140. Jump up^ Poole, Patrick, (26 March 2007). “Mainstreaming the Muslim Brotherhood”.FrontPage Magazine. p. 39. Retrieved 28 November 2012. “citing Sylvain Besson, La Conquête De L’Occident: Le Projet Secret Des Islamistes
  141. Jump up^ “Revolutionary leader”Gulf News. Retrieved 27 August 2010.
  142. Jump up^ Miles Axe Copeland, Jr., “The Game of Nations: The Amorality of Power Politics“, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1970
  143. Jump up^ Lufti, Manal (14 March 2007). “The Brotherhood and America Part III”Asharq Alawsat.
  144. Jump up^ MEMRI, the Middle East Media Research Institute posted this at their website, [2]introducing it with the following: “On November 29, ‘Ain-Al-Yaqeen, a weekly news magazine published online by the Saudi royal family, released an English translation of an interview with Saudi Minister of Interior Prince Nayef Ibn Abd Al-Aziz; the interview originally appeared in the Kuwaiti newspaper Al Siyasa. The following are excerpts from the translation[1] as it appeared in the Saudi weekly.”
  145. Jump up^ article printed in Al Ahram Weekly 5–9 July 1997, quoted in Passion for Islam: Shaping the Modern Middle East: the Egyptian Experience by Caryle Murphy, pp. 241, 330.
  146. Jump up^ Passion for Islam: Shaping the Modern Middle East: the Egyptian Experience, by Caryle Murphy, Simon and Schuster, 2002, pp. 241, 330.
  147. Jump up^ Shenker, Jack; Whitaker, Brian (8 February 2011). “The Muslim Brotherhood uncovered”The Guardian.
  148. Jump up^ Crane, Mary. “Does the Muslim Brotherhood Have Ties to Terrorism”. Council on Foreign Relations.
  149. Jump up^ “Egypt unrest: What if Mubarak goes?”. BBC News. 31 January 2011.
  150. Jump up^ “Muslim Brother Hood Condemns 9/11 attack”.
  151. Jump up^ “Morsi: 9/11 a global calamity, not only for U.S.”.
  152. Jump up^ “The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood”. Archived from the original on 2012-05-25.
  153. Jump up^ “The root of terrorism is Wahabism”.
  154. Jump up^ “The root of terrorism”.
  155. Jump up^ Atran, Scott (2 February 2011). “Egypt’s Bumbling Brotherhood”The New York Times.
  156. Jump up^ Want Shariah, End of Israel Treaty, Pew Poll Shows date:26 April 2011
  157. Jump up^ Arab Women As Likely As Men To Support Islamic Law In Middle East After Arab Spring, Says SurveyHuffington Post, 25 June 2012
  158. Jump up^ “Egypt’s muslim brotherhood welcomes idea of U.S. contacts”Reuters. 30 June 2011.


  • Abdullahi, Abdurahman (Baadiyow) (October 2008) “The Islah Movement: Islamic moderation in war-torn Somalia” Hiiraan Online Mogadishu, Somalia
  • Ankerl, Guy (2000) Coexisting Contemporary Civilizations: Arabo-Muslim, Bharati, Chinese, and Western. INUPRESS, Geneva. ISBN 2-88155-004-5
  • Baer, Robert (2002). See No Evil: The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA’s War on Terrorism. Three Rivers Press. ISBN 978-1-4000-4684-3.
  • Cohen, Amnon (1982). Political Parties in the West Bank under the Jordanian Regime, 1949–1967. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. ISBN 978-0-8014-1321-6.
  • Cohen, Nick (9 July 2006) “The Foreign Office ought to be serving Britain, not radical Islam” The Observer London
  • Dreyfuss, Robert (2006). Devil’s Game: How the United States Helped Unleash Fundamentalist Islam. Owl Books. ISBN 978-0-8050-7652-3.
  • Mallmann, Klaus-Michael and Martin Cüppers (2006) Halbmond und Hakenkreuz: Das ‘Dritte Reich’, die Araber und Palästina Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt.ISBN 978-3-534-19729-3
  • Mayer, Thomas (1982) “The Military Force of Islam: The Society of the Muslim Brethren and the Palestine Question, 1945–1948” In Kedourie, Elie and Haim, Sylvia G. (1982)Zionism and Arabism in Palestine and Israel Frank Cass, London, pp. 100–117, ISBN 0-7146-3169-8
  • Mura, Andrea (2012). “A genealogical inquiry into early Islamism: the discourse of Hasan al-Banna“. Journal of Political Ideologies 17 (1): 61–85.
  • Zahid, Mohammed (2012) The Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt’s Succession Crisis: The Politics of Liberalisation and Reform in the Middle East I. B. Tauris ISBN 1780762178
  • Leikrn, Robert S. and Steven Brooke (2007) The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood, Foreign Affairs.
  • “The Nazi Roots of Palestinian Nationalism and Islamic Jihad,” by David Meir-Levi (2007).

External links

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Posted by on November 30, 2012 in Uncategorized